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Hello, everyone.

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This week's surveillance report covers

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Notion's AI chat transcripts exposed

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through its AI provider,

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Quad9 getting pushed out

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of France by site-blocking orders

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and what that means for the open internet,

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hundreds of Tor exit nodes hijacked

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to intercept SSH and email,

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Proton and their internal AI push, as well

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as the controversy around that, the secret

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court ruling on how the US spies

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on Americans, and our usual data breaches,

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threats, and open source updates.

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Welcome everybody to the Techlore

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Surveillance Report, your essential,

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formerly weekly tech news, delivering

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deep analysis on the latest threats

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to security, privacy, and digital freedom.

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I definitely wanna come forward

00:00:42.520 --> 00:00:44.420 line:90%,end
and just give the disclaimer that this

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does have a very massive delay behind it.

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Between travel and working on Go Incognito

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and our other regular content,

00:00:51.760 --> 00:00:53.760 line:90%,end
we've just been really behind on things,

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including the surveillance report.

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I just really wanna thank you all

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for your patience.

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I know I say that a lot, but truly,

00:00:59.040 --> 00:01:00.850 line:90%,end
like, it, it really means a lot

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that you guys are patient

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when I get these things done.

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And also, I will be trimming stories

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to try to still keep this digestible,

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so I'm gonna take the h- main things

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that happened in the last several weeks,

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as well as prioritizing things

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in the last one to two weeks.

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Without further ado,

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let's get into the highlight.

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This story has a lot of moving parts,

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and I know that, um,

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a lot of you listening aren't AI native,

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and so I'm gonna try

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to explain how this works,

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what the lessons are, and why

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this is definitely, I think, a, a good

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story to, to teach us some things here.

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So first, we have this company

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called Fireworks AI.

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Now, the best way I can describe Fireworks

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is that they provide AI infrastructure.

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So if you're a company,

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a small business, or even an individual,

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you can essentially use them,

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and they host models for you, and then

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they're gonna give you an API key.

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You can put that into any desktop client

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or AI harness or anything else you wanna

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be using to use large language models,

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whether it's for coding

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or just general usage.

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What happened here,

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and this is kind of the first story,

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is that in early October, we actually

00:02:00.680 --> 00:02:04.340 line:90%,end
saw attackers take API keys stored

00:02:04.340 --> 00:02:07.200 line:90%,end
as secrets for some Fireworks accounts.

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Now, in October 23rd through 24th,

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attackers breached an unnamed cloud

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provider hosting Fireworks' R&amp;D machines,

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and they used that access

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to get into their development systems.

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They got customer billing info,

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resource metadata,

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and partial model weights and data sets.

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Now, where this gets really interesting is

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that it, this is actually tied to Notion

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because Notion released some built-in AI

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native features, specifically AI Insights.

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That's the feature that they use.

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And so transcripts from about 1%

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of those workspaces were exposed.

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That means that everything

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that users typed into the AI's

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replies within Notion's AI Insights

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was potentially exposed for these people.

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Notion has this article that tries

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to, in some ways, be transparent

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about what this leak included, uh,

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but I, I, I also feel like it's not quite

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as transparent as it looks to be.

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So they have this, uh, little FAQ

00:03:06.070 --> 00:03:08.120 line:90%,end
on the bottom here, and one of them says,

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"I have ZDR as part of my Enterprise plan.

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What does it cover for Notion AI use?"

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Now, ZDR is zero-data retention,

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and what this means is the overall concept

00:03:17.460 --> 00:03:19.640 line:90%,end
that, hey, we are telling someone,

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and we are hoping, and we have,

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you know, this overall written agreement

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that they're not supposed

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to store these chats anywhere.

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The problem with this is that it kind

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of downplays what I would assume people

00:03:30.520 --> 00:03:32.630 line:90%,end
think ZDR means because Notion tries

00:03:32.630 --> 00:03:34.380 line:90%,end
to clear up here on the very bottom

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of this, uh, FAQ, by the way,

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that this ZDR only covers live requests

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Notion sends to AI vendors to generate

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answers, but it is not intended

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to cover features that need stored data,

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including chat history and insights,

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which is very confusing to me because

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how am I, a regular user, supposed to know

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when I'm using this AI tool or this AI

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tool what's stored and what isn't stored?

00:03:56.660 --> 00:03:58.260 line:90%,end
It's either zero-data retention,

00:03:58.260 --> 00:04:00.110 line:90%,end
or it's not zero-data retention,

00:04:00.110 --> 00:04:01.610 line:90%,end
and I feel like the way they're

00:04:01.610 --> 00:04:03.220 line:90%,end
describing this isn't truly

00:04:03.220 --> 00:04:05.600 line:90%,end
in the spirit of zero-data retention.

00:04:05.600 --> 00:04:07.360 line:90%,end
I would call this some data

00:04:07.360 --> 00:04:09.300 line:90%,end
retention, so maybe SDR.

00:04:09.300 --> 00:04:10.780 line:90%,end
For context, what this means

00:04:10.780 --> 00:04:13.200 line:90%,end
is that theoretically, based on my read

00:04:13.200 --> 00:04:14.750 line:90%,end
of this, an Enterprise customer

00:04:14.750 --> 00:04:16.600 line:90%,end
who was under the impression they had

00:04:16.600 --> 00:04:18.720 line:90%,end
ZDR enabled, which again is zero-data

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retention, could have had their chats go

00:04:21.700 --> 00:04:23.300 line:90%,end
to Fireworks if their workspace

00:04:23.300 --> 00:04:25.080 line:90%,end
was using the Insights feature.

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I think that's a pretty huge violation

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of trust, especially because Notion

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did an investigation on Fireworks.

00:04:30.980 --> 00:04:32.930 line:90%,end
Again, that's the original company here

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that was supplying kind

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of the infrastructure.

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And Fireworks actually kept

00:04:37.410 --> 00:04:39.160 line:90%,end
the data anyway and wasn't sticking

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to their ZDR promise.

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So I think both companies

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really screwed up here.

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I think Notion in many ways overpromised

00:04:44.900 --> 00:04:46.040 line:90%,end
and overrepresented

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and also is under-communicating and still

00:04:48.740 --> 00:04:52.050 line:90%,end
being very cl- unclear on what actually,

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like, zero-data retention means

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and how to use any of their AI privately,

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which it seems like I would say you can't

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because they're not being very clear

00:04:58.860 --> 00:05:00.160 line:90%,end
about what that looks like.

00:05:00.160 --> 00:05:01.670 line:90%,end
And also, it's kind of a big deal

00:05:01.670 --> 00:05:03.720 line:90%,end
that Fireworks, their investigation found

00:05:03.720 --> 00:05:05.380 line:90%,end
that Fireworks was not storing things

00:05:05.380 --> 00:05:06.630 line:90%,end
in the way they promised.

00:05:06.630 --> 00:05:08.570 line:90%,end
So I have quite a few lessons here.

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One, if you're a Notion user,

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a chat with Notion AI, you

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should just assume isn't just with Notion,

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and you're trusting some

00:05:14.080 --> 00:05:15.280 line:90%,end
companies in that chain.

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Two, I think it's still safe in 2026

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to assume that ZDR is a step in the right

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direction to try to keep LLM chats a bit

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more private, but I still wouldn't count

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on it as your only thing protecting you.

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Three, I think what is actually

00:05:30.270 --> 00:05:31.840 line:90%,end
driving a lot of this is actually

00:05:31.840 --> 00:05:32.820 line:90%,end
looking for information

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that people paste into these chats,

00:05:34.480 --> 00:05:36.580 line:90%,end
which probably includes secrets, API keys,

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et cetera, and so just be very careful

00:05:38.480 --> 00:05:40.200 line:90%,end
with what you give LLMs.

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You can still set up a local LLM

00:05:42.240 --> 00:05:44.060 line:90%,end
to sanitize any of your prompts

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before you give it to an online provider.

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And finally, I've been

00:05:47.300 --> 00:05:48.600 line:90%,end
seeing this more and more.

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We see, you know, like budgeting apps,

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fricking health apps,

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everything nowadays now has

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integrated some kind of AI chatbot.

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Just be aware that a majority of those are

00:05:59.320 --> 00:06:01.420 line:90%,end
in some way, shape, or form using a system

00:06:01.420 --> 00:06:03.380 line:90%,end
like this, where they are outsourcing

00:06:03.380 --> 00:06:05.520 line:90%,end
the LLM technology to some other company.

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A lot of them use ChatGPT,

00:06:06.820 --> 00:06:08.070 line:90%,end
and they actually forward

00:06:08.070 --> 00:06:09.470 line:90%,end
all your queries to ChatGPT.

00:06:09.470 --> 00:06:11.040 line:90%,end
And so it's worth reading the privacy

00:06:11.040 --> 00:06:12.990 line:90%,end
policies and digging a little bit deeper

00:06:12.990 --> 00:06:14.660 line:90%,end
and not assuming that any LLM

00:06:14.660 --> 00:06:16.610 line:90%,end
is actually being hosted by the service

00:06:16.610 --> 00:06:18.300 line:90%,end
you're already trusting with your data.

00:06:18.300 --> 00:06:19.950 line:90%,end
I've been playing a bit more with these

00:06:19.950 --> 00:06:22.520 line:90%,end
AI models, and I have zero-data retention

00:06:22.520 --> 00:06:24.620 line:90%,end
set up using some, like, open router stuff

00:06:24.620 --> 00:06:25.960 line:90%,end
that I'm using for some things.

00:06:25.960 --> 00:06:27.580 line:90%,end
And honestly, reading this story,

00:06:27.580 --> 00:06:29.350 line:90%,end
I'm gonna put a- even a little bit less

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trust than I already was in those things.

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Um, and I think that this is kind

00:06:33.050 --> 00:06:35.276 line:90%,end
of a big deal, and I think that it really

00:06:35.276 --> 00:06:36.676 line:90%,end
calls into question the kind

00:06:36.676 --> 00:06:38.336 line:90%,end
of privacy guarantees that these companies

00:06:38.336 --> 00:06:40.236 line:90%,end
can realistically provide, and it kind

00:06:40.236 --> 00:06:42.056 line:90%,end
of hurts the whole industry because right

00:06:42.056 --> 00:06:43.956 line:90%,end
now, kind of the main reason a company

00:06:43.956 --> 00:06:45.716 line:90%,end
or an individual would actually pay

00:06:45.716 --> 00:06:47.816 line:90%,end
so much more money for API credits through

00:06:47.816 --> 00:06:49.716 line:90%,end
a third-party company instead of going

00:06:49.716 --> 00:06:51.466 line:90%,end
directly through a big tech company

00:06:51.466 --> 00:06:53.316 line:90%,end
is because of the privacy guarantees.

00:06:53.316 --> 00:06:54.296 line:90%,end
That's all I have to say there.

00:06:54.296 --> 00:06:56.046 line:90%,end
We have hundreds of Tor exit nodes,

00:06:56.046 --> 00:06:58.076 line:90%,end
we have Proton's AI push, and we have

00:06:58.076 --> 00:07:00.216 line:90%,end
a secret court talking about how u-

00:07:00.216 --> 00:07:02.276 line:90%,end
the US still spies on Americans.

00:07:02.276 --> 00:07:03.876 line:90%,end
But before we get there,

00:07:03.876 --> 00:07:05.556 line:90%,end
let's talk about France

00:07:05.556 --> 00:07:08.736 line:90%,end
and how they are blocking Quad9.

00:07:17.256 --> 00:07:19.156 line:90%,end
This is a story that I can shamelessly

00:07:19.156 --> 00:07:21.396 line:90%,end
plug our Techlore Talks sister podcast

00:07:21.396 --> 00:07:23.616 line:90%,end
because I just interviewed John Todd

00:07:23.616 --> 00:07:26.226 line:90%,end
from Quad9, like, last month talking

00:07:26.226 --> 00:07:27.216 line:90%,end
about this very issue.

00:07:27.216 --> 00:07:28.486 line:90%,end
Maybe it was two months ago now.

00:07:28.486 --> 00:07:30.136 line:90%,end
But anyway, it was pretty recent,

00:07:30.136 --> 00:07:31.486 line:90%,end
and I pretty much asked him

00:07:31.486 --> 00:07:33.936 line:90%,end
about what's going on in France, and he...

00:07:34.356 --> 00:07:36.396 line:90%,end
I- I- it's coming from Quad9 themselves.

00:07:36.396 --> 00:07:38.176 line:90%,end
Quad9 is a DNS provider.

00:07:38.176 --> 00:07:40.626 line:90%,end
All of you right now are using a DNS.

00:07:40.626 --> 00:07:42.136 line:90%,end
Hopefully it's not your internet

00:07:42.136 --> 00:07:43.936 line:90%,end
service providers, but when you type

00:07:43.936 --> 00:07:46.316 line:90%,end
in google.com or amazon.com,

00:07:46.316 --> 00:07:48.116 line:90%,end
a DNS provider is essentially taking

00:07:48.116 --> 00:07:49.696 line:90%,end
those words and converting them

00:07:49.696 --> 00:07:51.566 line:90%,end
into the IP addresses of the servers

00:07:51.566 --> 00:07:53.516 line:90%,end
that are actually hosted by the website,

00:07:53.516 --> 00:07:55.106 line:90%,end
so you can connect to the website.

00:07:55.106 --> 00:07:56.306 line:90%,end
Quad9 is one of the most

00:07:56.306 --> 00:07:58.206 line:90%,end
privacy-respecting services out there.

00:07:58.206 --> 00:08:00.376 line:90%,end
Unfortunately, the French court order

00:08:00.376 --> 00:08:02.466 line:90%,end
that Quad9 must block access to websites

00:08:02.466 --> 00:08:03.966 line:90%,end
that are accused of infringing

00:08:03.966 --> 00:08:06.506 line:90%,end
the copyrights actually did go through.

00:08:06.506 --> 00:08:08.256 line:90%,end
Quad9 has explained that the French

00:08:08.256 --> 00:08:10.356 line:90%,end
court's order forces it to make a decision

00:08:10.356 --> 00:08:12.006 line:90%,end
that either way is bad for users.

00:08:12.006 --> 00:08:13.656 line:90%,end
It could either extend French law

00:08:13.656 --> 00:08:14.606 line:90%,end
to the whole world,

00:08:14.606 --> 00:08:16.516 line:90%,end
blocking globally, or try to identify

00:08:16.516 --> 00:08:18.176 line:90%,end
and block users only in France,

00:08:18.176 --> 00:08:19.926 line:90%,end
something that it can't do reliably

00:08:19.926 --> 00:08:21.536 line:90%,end
and a move that would leave the company

00:08:21.536 --> 00:08:23.136 line:90%,end
facing massive fines if it fails

00:08:23.136 --> 00:08:25.376 line:90%,end
to block websites perfectly within France.

00:08:25.376 --> 00:08:26.666 line:90%,end
Quad9 says it is facing

00:08:26.666 --> 00:08:27.816 line:90%,end
about 20 other lawsuits

00:08:27.816 --> 00:08:30.206 line:90%,end
in France seeking similar blocking orders.

00:08:30.206 --> 00:08:31.856 line:90%,end
So rather than accept these demands,

00:08:31.856 --> 00:08:32.916 line:90%,end
they've decided to withdraw

00:08:32.916 --> 00:08:34.216 line:90%,end
their service from France.

00:08:34.216 --> 00:08:37.606 line:90%,end
It's crazy how downstream of a way

00:08:37.606 --> 00:08:39.356 line:90%,end
to solve this problem that this is.

00:08:39.356 --> 00:08:40.316 line:90%,end
It- I'm trying to find

00:08:40.316 --> 00:08:41.616 line:90%,end
a good analogy in my head.

00:08:41.616 --> 00:08:43.976 line:90%,end
It's, it's like if somebody gets a knife

00:08:43.976 --> 00:08:46.086 line:90%,end
into a courtroom or, or something

00:08:46.086 --> 00:08:47.036 line:90%,end
like this, you know?

00:08:47.036 --> 00:08:48.456 line:90%,end
Someone, someone takes something

00:08:48.456 --> 00:08:50.146 line:90%,end
into a courtroom they shouldn't have.

00:08:50.146 --> 00:08:52.656 line:90%,end
It's not going to the security officers.

00:08:52.656 --> 00:08:55.156 line:90%,end
It's not, like, seeing the security lapses

00:08:55.156 --> 00:08:57.036 line:90%,end
that led to it being possible.

00:08:57.036 --> 00:08:59.456 line:90%,end
It's not even blaming, like, the knife

00:08:59.456 --> 00:09:01.356 line:90%,end
or the, let's say a gun manufacturer.

00:09:01.356 --> 00:09:03.356 line:90%,end
It's not even blaming the store maybe

00:09:03.356 --> 00:09:04.676 line:90%,end
where someone got it from.

00:09:04.676 --> 00:09:07.076 line:90%,end
It's literally blaming, like, the truck

00:09:07.076 --> 00:09:08.576 line:90%,end
that delivered it to the store

00:09:08.576 --> 00:09:10.286 line:90%,end
where the person then bought it from.

00:09:10.286 --> 00:09:12.936 line:90%,end
Like, it is so downstream from the actual

00:09:12.936 --> 00:09:15.436 line:90%,end
flipping problem, and this is just never

00:09:15.436 --> 00:09:17.016 line:90%,end
gonna fix this kind of piracy.

00:09:17.016 --> 00:09:18.866 line:90%,end
So this to me is just a huge attack

00:09:18.866 --> 00:09:19.916 line:90%,end
on the open internet.

00:09:19.916 --> 00:09:21.676 line:90%,end
When these things happen in one country,

00:09:21.676 --> 00:09:23.376 line:90%,end
they impact the rest of the world,

00:09:23.376 --> 00:09:27.256 line:90%,end
and the implications of, uh, using DNS

00:09:27.256 --> 00:09:30.036 line:90%,end
in any way to censor content is massive

00:09:30.036 --> 00:09:32.136 line:90%,end
because it is a very central way to do it,

00:09:32.136 --> 00:09:33.116 line:90%,end
and it's stupid.

00:09:33.116 --> 00:09:34.516 line:90%,end
Like, it's straight up dumb.

00:09:34.516 --> 00:09:37.996 line:90%,end
Like, you can host your own DNS resolver

00:09:37.996 --> 00:09:39.576 line:90%,end
like, from your own house.

00:09:39.576 --> 00:09:41.076 line:90%,end
So it's the kind of thing kind

00:09:41.076 --> 00:09:43.416 line:90%,end
of like trying to block VPNs, where it

00:09:43.416 --> 00:09:45.266 line:90%,end
is very effective against the regular

00:09:45.266 --> 00:09:46.836 line:90%,end
person, but it doesn't actually stop

00:09:46.836 --> 00:09:48.186 line:90%,end
people from accessing a website

00:09:48.186 --> 00:09:49.836 line:90%,end
because just removing the pointer

00:09:49.836 --> 00:09:51.086 line:90%,end
to the website doesn't take down

00:09:51.086 --> 00:09:52.436 line:90%,end
the website or the content.

00:09:52.436 --> 00:09:54.456 line:90%,end
It just makes it a little bit harder,

00:09:54.456 --> 00:09:56.826 line:90%,end
and i- in the process, you're now creating

00:09:56.826 --> 00:09:58.876 line:90%,end
the infrastructure and the systems to try

00:09:58.876 --> 00:10:00.816 line:90%,end
to identify users, which regions they're

00:10:00.816 --> 00:10:02.816 line:90%,end
in, and also controlling what sites they

00:10:02.816 --> 00:10:04.216 line:90%,end
can access, which is a...

00:10:04.416 --> 00:10:05.316 line:90%,end
I- it's just bad.

00:10:05.316 --> 00:10:06.806 line:90%,end
So let's fight for Quad9.

00:10:06.806 --> 00:10:07.956 line:90%,end
If you haven't already,

00:10:07.956 --> 00:10:10.006 line:90%,end
you can support Quad9 from their website,

00:10:10.006 --> 00:10:11.936 line:90%,end
and I would strongly recommend listening

00:10:11.936 --> 00:10:13.446 line:90%,end
to the Techlore Talks episode I did

00:10:13.446 --> 00:10:15.096 line:90%,end
with John Todd because we covered

00:10:15.096 --> 00:10:16.416 line:90%,end
this whole issue extensively,

00:10:16.416 --> 00:10:18.416 line:90%,end
and he explains it far better than I do.

00:10:26.816 --> 00:10:27.246 line:90%,end
All right.

00:10:27.246 --> 00:10:29.126 line:90%,end
Coming soon we have Proton's AI push,

00:10:29.126 --> 00:10:30.276 line:90%,end
the secret court ruling

00:10:30.276 --> 00:10:31.996 line:90%,end
on how the US spies on Americans.

00:10:31.996 --> 00:10:33.736 line:90%,end
But before we get there, we have

00:10:33.736 --> 00:10:35.786 line:90%,end
a little story here on Tor exit nodes.

00:10:35.786 --> 00:10:37.336 line:90%,end
So this came from Ars Technica,

00:10:37.336 --> 00:10:38.896 line:90%,end
and the way that they reported it

00:10:38.896 --> 00:10:40.496 line:90%,end
is that unknown hackers hijacked

00:10:40.496 --> 00:10:42.516 line:90%,end
more than 300 Tor exit nodes

00:10:42.516 --> 00:10:45.076 line:90%,end
and reconfigured them to favor unencrypted

00:10:45.076 --> 00:10:47.426 line:90%,end
email traffic and redirect SSH connections

00:10:47.426 --> 00:10:49.276 line:90%,end
through servers that they controlled.

00:10:49.276 --> 00:10:50.576 line:90%,end
It's a very crafty attack.

00:10:50.576 --> 00:10:52.676 line:90%,end
So they take over the servers, but there's

00:10:52.676 --> 00:10:54.766 line:90%,end
nothing obviously wrong with the servers.

00:10:54.766 --> 00:10:56.376 line:90%,end
The way that they put it, if you happen

00:10:56.376 --> 00:10:58.006 line:90%,end
to get a circuit that exits over one

00:10:58.006 --> 00:10:59.656 line:90%,end
of those 333 infected exit nodes,

00:10:59.656 --> 00:11:01.516 line:90%,end
you won't notice anything at first.

00:11:01.516 --> 00:11:03.216 line:90%,end
Encrypted web traffic is forwarded

00:11:03.216 --> 00:11:04.616 line:90%,end
as usual, but if you attempt

00:11:04.616 --> 00:11:06.956 line:90%,end
an SSH connection over port 22,

00:11:06.956 --> 00:11:08.756 line:90%,end
you're unknowingly redirected to one

00:11:08.756 --> 00:11:11.026 line:90%,end
of 12 SSH interception servers.

00:11:11.026 --> 00:11:12.766 line:90%,end
And you're gonna get the warning if any

00:11:12.766 --> 00:11:14.456 line:90%,end
of you guys have used SSH before.

00:11:14.456 --> 00:11:16.306 line:90%,end
There's this, like, lots of @ symbols

00:11:16.306 --> 00:11:17.486 line:90%,end
and it says, "Warning: Remote

00:11:17.486 --> 00:11:19.136 line:90%,end
host identification has changed."

00:11:19.136 --> 00:11:20.666 line:90%,end
Um, so that's what would've been flagged,

00:11:20.666 --> 00:11:21.616 line:90%,end
and if you accepted

00:11:21.616 --> 00:11:23.256 line:90%,end
that without verifying it,

00:11:23.256 --> 00:11:25.406 line:90%,end
then it would've stolen your SSH password,

00:11:25.406 --> 00:11:27.016 line:90%,end
opened a connection to the server,

00:11:27.016 --> 00:11:28.536 line:90%,end
and observed all typed commands,

00:11:28.536 --> 00:11:30.636 line:90%,end
and it would've opened a second connection

00:11:30.636 --> 00:11:32.896 line:90%,end
and infected the server with Ebury.

00:11:32.896 --> 00:11:33.396 line:90%,end
Ebury?

00:11:33.396 --> 00:11:34.436 line:90%,end
I don't know how to pronounce it,

00:11:34.436 --> 00:11:36.156 line:90%,end
but it's a backdoor written for Linux

00:11:36.156 --> 00:11:37.696 line:90%,end
that was discovered 12 years ago

00:11:37.696 --> 00:11:39.696 line:90%,end
apparently, so it's pretty legacy stuff.

00:11:39.696 --> 00:11:41.676 line:90%,end
It's before I was following any of this.

00:11:41.676 --> 00:11:43.576 line:90%,end
The reason this is such an interesting

00:11:43.576 --> 00:11:46.056 line:90%,end
attack here is that we don't really

00:11:46.056 --> 00:11:47.976 line:90%,end
know much about why this happened,

00:11:47.976 --> 00:11:50.516 line:90%,end
what the overall goals were.

00:11:50.516 --> 00:11:52.176 line:90%,end
There's some speculation

00:11:52.176 --> 00:11:54.356 line:90%,end
that this is a financially motivated crime

00:11:54.356 --> 00:11:56.996 line:90%,end
group, but there's really no confirmation,

00:11:56.996 --> 00:11:59.076 line:90%,end
and even then, they don't know why some

00:11:59.076 --> 00:12:00.766 line:90%,end
of these orgs accepted an RSA key

00:12:00.766 --> 00:12:02.116 line:90%,end
when there's no evidence it

00:12:02.116 --> 00:12:04.356 line:90%,end
was an authorized SSH certificate.

00:12:04.356 --> 00:12:05.936 line:90%,end
Some takeaways for you all.

00:12:05.936 --> 00:12:07.036 line:90%,end
One, this doesn't mean

00:12:07.036 --> 00:12:08.246 line:90%,end
that Tor is useless.

00:12:08.246 --> 00:12:10.046 line:90%,end
It just means you need to understand

00:12:10.046 --> 00:12:13.396 line:90%,end
that the final hop in Tor, the exit relay,

00:12:13.396 --> 00:12:15.476 line:90%,end
sees whatever leaves Tor unencrypted,

00:12:15.476 --> 00:12:16.356 line:90%,end
and this has been

00:12:16.356 --> 00:12:17.836 line:90%,end
a well-known thing about Tor.

00:12:17.836 --> 00:12:19.646 line:90%,end
So make sure that you still utilize

00:12:19.646 --> 00:12:21.596 line:90%,end
end-to-end encryption whenever you can.

00:12:21.596 --> 00:12:22.696 line:90%,end
It's still useful even

00:12:22.696 --> 00:12:24.296 line:90%,end
when routing things through Tor.

00:12:24.296 --> 00:12:26.476 line:90%,end
Second, the default protections did hold.

00:12:26.476 --> 00:12:28.056 line:90%,end
HTTPS, onion services,

00:12:28.056 --> 00:12:31.346 line:90%,end
and properly checked SSH all survived.

00:12:31.346 --> 00:12:32.996 line:90%,end
Only people who ignored a warning

00:12:32.996 --> 00:12:35.036 line:90%,end
or used plain text were exposed here.

00:12:35.036 --> 00:12:36.586 line:90%,end
Third, I do recommend using SSH

00:12:36.586 --> 00:12:38.276 line:90%,end
keys instead of passwords if you do

00:12:38.276 --> 00:12:39.976 line:90%,end
any kind of, like, sysadmin stuff.

00:12:39.976 --> 00:12:41.586 line:90%,end
This is something that isn't too hard

00:12:41.586 --> 00:12:42.536 line:90%,end
to set up nowadays.

00:12:42.536 --> 00:12:43.996 line:90%,end
Fourth, downgrade attacks

00:12:43.996 --> 00:12:44.846 line:90%,end
are a real thing.

00:12:44.846 --> 00:12:46.066 line:90%,end
One of the things they tried

00:12:46.066 --> 00:12:48.196 line:90%,end
was blocking access to some ports.

00:12:48.196 --> 00:12:50.416 line:90%,end
So try to configure your clients to refuse

00:12:50.416 --> 00:12:52.236 line:90%,end
an unencrypted fallback if that's

00:12:52.236 --> 00:12:53.956 line:90%,end
something that you are utilizing.

00:13:02.426 --> 00:13:03.886 line:90%,end
All right, this one I know you

00:13:03.886 --> 00:13:05.006 line:90%,end
guys have been asking about.

00:13:05.006 --> 00:13:07.006 line:90%,end
Like, I'm, I'm publishing various pieces

00:13:07.006 --> 00:13:08.366 line:90%,end
of content trying to get caught up,

00:13:08.366 --> 00:13:09.666 line:90%,end
and the comments are like,

00:13:09.666 --> 00:13:11.756 line:90%,end
"Why aren't you talking about Proton?"

00:13:11.756 --> 00:13:12.806 line:90%,end
So we talked about it

00:13:12.806 --> 00:13:14.426 line:90%,end
in the live stream a little bit last week,

00:13:14.426 --> 00:13:16.526 line:90%,end
so if you wanna see some more of my, like,

00:13:16.606 --> 00:13:18.106 line:90%,end
I guess unfiltered thoughts, I mean,

00:13:18.106 --> 00:13:19.486 line:90%,end
they're gonna be pretty much the same,

00:13:19.486 --> 00:13:21.246 line:90%,end
but if you want it in a different format,

00:13:21.246 --> 00:13:23.066 line:90%,end
I, I covered it in last week's stream.

00:13:23.066 --> 00:13:24.116 line:90%,end
There was a manifesto

00:13:24.116 --> 00:13:26.826 line:90%,end
that was published by Proton's CTO.

00:13:26.826 --> 00:13:28.276 line:90%,end
This has been some confusion.

00:13:28.276 --> 00:13:29.726 line:90%,end
P- The- it's different people

00:13:29.726 --> 00:13:31.276 line:90%,end
that did different things here.

00:13:32.066 --> 00:13:34.666 line:90%,end
The manifesto, just to summarize,

00:13:34.666 --> 00:13:38.326 line:90%,end
I guess my read of it is, you know, why AI

00:13:38.326 --> 00:13:40.786 line:90%,end
is important for work, why AI is needed

00:13:40.786 --> 00:13:43.346 line:90%,end
to keep up with big tech, et cetera.

00:13:43.346 --> 00:13:45.906 line:90%,end
I think it's actually overall

00:13:45.906 --> 00:13:47.456 line:90%,end
not the worst thing I've read,

00:13:47.456 --> 00:13:48.546 line:90%,end
and I don't think that's

00:13:48.546 --> 00:13:50.446 line:90%,end
what the outrage is really about here.

00:13:50.446 --> 00:13:51.686 line:90%,end
I've read the manifesto.

00:13:51.686 --> 00:13:53.586 line:90%,end
I think that if you're really anti-AI,

00:13:53.586 --> 00:13:55.026 line:90%,end
you're not gonna like any of it.

00:13:55.026 --> 00:13:56.226 line:90%,end
If you're really pro-AI,

00:13:56.226 --> 00:13:58.076 line:90%,end
you're gonna think that, "Yeah, duh."

00:13:58.076 --> 00:13:59.206 line:90%,end
And I think if you're kind

00:13:59.206 --> 00:14:01.306 line:90%,end
of in the middle on reading the manifesto,

00:14:01.306 --> 00:14:01.826 line:90%,end
you're gonna go,

00:14:01.826 --> 00:14:03.386 line:90%,end
"Okay, that's kind of interesting,

00:14:03.386 --> 00:14:05.126 line:90%,end
but I, I don't know about this yet."

00:14:05.126 --> 00:14:07.176 line:90%,end
The difference is that Proton is supposed

00:14:07.176 --> 00:14:08.646 line:90%,end
to be kind of, you know,

00:14:08.646 --> 00:14:11.256 line:90%,end
how to do tech differently from big tech.

00:14:11.256 --> 00:14:13.106 line:90%,end
So where do we draw the line on that?

00:14:13.106 --> 00:14:13.946 line:90%,end
What does that really mean?

00:14:13.946 --> 00:14:15.606 line:90%,end
And I think that's really what the

00:14:15.606 --> 00:14:17.486 line:90%,end
question is that's being brought up here.

00:14:17.486 --> 00:14:19.386 line:90%,end
So I would say that's overall part one

00:14:19.386 --> 00:14:20.946 line:90%,end
of the story is this manifesto

00:14:20.946 --> 00:14:23.036 line:90%,end
that went out to all their employees,

00:14:23.036 --> 00:14:24.486 line:90%,end
and some of the employees had

00:14:24.486 --> 00:14:25.986 line:90%,end
some thoughts to say about it.

00:14:25.986 --> 00:14:27.486 line:90%,end
Now, this is kind of part two

00:14:27.486 --> 00:14:29.566 line:90%,end
to the story, and this is from Andy Yen,

00:14:29.566 --> 00:14:31.226 line:90%,end
who's the CEO of Proton,

00:14:31.226 --> 00:14:32.726 line:90%,end
so different person

00:14:32.726 --> 00:14:34.956 line:90%,end
than the person who wrote the manifesto.

00:14:34.956 --> 00:14:36.156 line:90%,end
This is where I think it

00:14:36.156 --> 00:14:37.566 line:90%,end
gets a little dicier.

00:14:37.566 --> 00:14:39.456 line:90%,end
"An employee in the company security

00:14:39.456 --> 00:14:41.006 line:90%,end
Slack channel urged the company

00:14:41.006 --> 00:14:43.066 line:90%,end
to at least take a few days to pen test

00:14:43.066 --> 00:14:46.226 line:90%,end
newly written code before pushing it live.

00:14:46.646 --> 00:14:48.386 line:90%,end
Andy said, 'That's bullshit

00:14:48.386 --> 00:14:49.776 line:90%,end
and loser thinking.

00:14:49.776 --> 00:14:50.926 line:90%,end
Of course it's possible

00:14:50.926 --> 00:14:53.026 line:90%,end
to be fast and secure,' Yen wrote

00:14:53.026 --> 00:14:54.826 line:90%,end
in the channel at the end of August.

00:14:54.826 --> 00:14:56.906 line:90%,end
'Stop thinking always of how to be slower

00:14:56.906 --> 00:14:59.266 line:90%,end
and focus more on how to be faster.'

00:14:59.266 --> 00:15:00.586 line:90%,end
Yen reiterated his point

00:15:00.586 --> 00:15:01.866 line:90%,end
in a follow-up message.

00:15:01.866 --> 00:15:03.366 line:90%,end
'Only losers think like that.'

00:15:03.366 --> 00:15:04.996 line:90%,end
His ultimate message for the team

00:15:04.996 --> 00:15:06.646 line:90%,end
was to stop lovingly handcrafting

00:15:06.646 --> 00:15:09.126 line:90%,end
all our code and use AI more."

00:15:09.126 --> 00:15:10.496 line:90%,end
So that's part two,

00:15:10.496 --> 00:15:11.826 line:90%,end
and I'll share more of my thoughts

00:15:11.826 --> 00:15:13.236 line:90%,end
in a second here, but I'm just trying

00:15:13.236 --> 00:15:14.786 line:90%,end
to get through the story first.

00:15:15.246 --> 00:15:16.686 line:90%,end
The third kind of part

00:15:16.686 --> 00:15:19.766 line:90%,end
to the story was AI re-interviews.

00:15:19.766 --> 00:15:22.446 line:90%,end
So this speaks more to the relationship

00:15:22.446 --> 00:15:24.686 line:90%,end
between employees and, uh,

00:15:24.686 --> 00:15:25.846 line:90%,end
Proton executives.

00:15:25.846 --> 00:15:27.846 line:90%,end
They pretty much wanted to re-interview

00:15:27.846 --> 00:15:31.286 line:90%,end
all the staff and overall assess the usage

00:15:31.586 --> 00:15:33.476 line:90%,end
of AI within the team.

00:15:33.476 --> 00:15:34.826 line:90%,end
Look, the implication here,

00:15:34.826 --> 00:15:36.656 line:90%,end
of course, is if you're not using AI,

00:15:36.656 --> 00:15:37.506 line:90%,end
that's a problem.

00:15:37.506 --> 00:15:39.466 line:90%,end
Now, this was ultimately canceled

00:15:39.466 --> 00:15:41.366 line:90%,end
because of so much backlash that came

00:15:41.366 --> 00:15:43.206 line:90%,end
from the previous two stories,

00:15:43.206 --> 00:15:45.246 line:90%,end
and a lot of employees came forward

00:15:45.246 --> 00:15:47.226 line:90%,end
and started coming out to news,

00:15:47.226 --> 00:15:48.876 line:90%,end
and they got a lot of bad press.

00:15:48.876 --> 00:15:50.626 line:90%,end
Proton sponsors some of our videos.

00:15:50.626 --> 00:15:52.106 line:90%,end
Like, we're very clear about what's

00:15:52.106 --> 00:15:53.856 line:90%,end
sponsored and what's not sponsored.

00:15:53.856 --> 00:15:55.506 line:90%,end
I have no issue still criticizing

00:15:55.506 --> 00:15:56.966 line:90%,end
them despite them being a sponsor.

00:15:56.966 --> 00:15:58.266 line:90%,end
I feel like we've balanced

00:15:58.266 --> 00:15:59.236 line:90%,end
that really nicely.

00:15:59.236 --> 00:16:00.886 line:90%,end
And so I'm gonna talk to you guys

00:16:00.886 --> 00:16:02.846 line:90%,end
as someone who uses Proton in my life.

00:16:02.846 --> 00:16:03.926 line:90%,end
I use Proton Pass.

00:16:03.926 --> 00:16:05.726 line:90%,end
I do all my aliasing through Proton.

00:16:05.726 --> 00:16:07.076 line:90%,end
I've been using Proton Mail

00:16:07.076 --> 00:16:08.806 line:90%,end
for, like, almost 10 years now,

00:16:08.806 --> 00:16:09.906 line:90%,end
which is crazy to say.

00:16:09.906 --> 00:16:11.926 line:90%,end
So my feelings as a user

00:16:11.926 --> 00:16:14.806 line:90%,end
as this is happening is I, I don't

00:16:14.806 --> 00:16:17.666 line:90%,end
like the cultural aspect of it.

00:16:17.666 --> 00:16:20.586 line:90%,end
Nothing in this to me was, like, directly

00:16:20.586 --> 00:16:24.866 line:90%,end
bad, but this culture of let's not slow

00:16:24.866 --> 00:16:27.526 line:90%,end
down, let's keep moving faster, it shows

00:16:27.526 --> 00:16:30.086 line:90%,end
to me that there is more incentive

00:16:30.086 --> 00:16:34.046 line:90%,end
in growth and revenue than necessarily

00:16:34.046 --> 00:16:35.586 line:90%,end
the right thing for the user.

00:16:35.586 --> 00:16:37.416 line:90%,end
Those two aren't the same thing,

00:16:37.416 --> 00:16:38.926 line:90%,end
and I think that this is something

00:16:38.926 --> 00:16:40.546 line:90%,end
that I've shared and a lot of people

00:16:40.546 --> 00:16:41.946 line:90%,end
in our audience have shared.

00:16:41.946 --> 00:16:43.546 line:90%,end
What they want from Proton isn't

00:16:43.546 --> 00:16:45.806 line:90%,end
necessarily right now more services

00:16:45.806 --> 00:16:47.546 line:90%,end
and doing more and gathering

00:16:47.546 --> 00:16:49.246 line:90%,end
more and promoting more.

00:16:49.246 --> 00:16:51.286 line:90%,end
It's more polish,

00:16:51.286 --> 00:16:52.886 line:90%,end
more attention to detail.

00:16:52.886 --> 00:16:54.806 line:90%,end
People want a Proton

00:16:54.806 --> 00:16:56.246 line:90%,end
Drive client for Linux.

00:16:56.246 --> 00:16:57.866 line:90%,end
They just want that to be done.

00:16:57.866 --> 00:16:59.866 line:90%,end
So my question in light of all

00:16:59.866 --> 00:17:03.286 line:90%,end
of this is does Proton want more AI

00:17:03.286 --> 00:17:06.006 line:90%,end
and to move faster and grow faster because

00:17:06.006 --> 00:17:08.006 line:90%,end
that's what it takes to fill in the rest

00:17:08.006 --> 00:17:09.856 line:90%,end
of their suite, or do they wanna grow

00:17:09.856 --> 00:17:12.986 line:90%,end
faster and be faster to expand and kind

00:17:12.986 --> 00:17:15.025 line:90%,end
of keep doing what they've been doing?

00:17:15.406 --> 00:17:17.125 line:90%,end
I unfortunately think

00:17:17.125 --> 00:17:19.266 line:90%,end
that it's more of the latter one.

00:17:19.266 --> 00:17:21.846 line:90%,end
I don't think AI fundamentally changes the

00:17:21.846 --> 00:17:24.606 line:90%,end
culture of a company nor their priorities.

00:17:24.606 --> 00:17:25.866 line:90%,end
It just makes whatever

00:17:25.866 --> 00:17:28.246 line:90%,end
their priorities are more enhanced.

00:17:28.246 --> 00:17:29.476 line:90%,end
And so I'm concerned

00:17:29.476 --> 00:17:31.026 line:90%,end
that if they keep going further

00:17:31.026 --> 00:17:32.466 line:90%,end
and further into what they're doing,

00:17:32.466 --> 00:17:34.506 line:90%,end
we're gonna see more and more of the same

00:17:34.506 --> 00:17:35.756 line:90%,end
things that people have been

00:17:35.756 --> 00:17:38.376 line:90%,end
criticizing Proton for doing already.

00:17:38.376 --> 00:17:40.126 line:90%,end
So that's my read on the situation,

00:17:40.126 --> 00:17:42.406 line:90%,end
and as a Proton user myself,

00:17:42.406 --> 00:17:43.516 line:90%,end
it's a bit unsettling.

00:17:43.516 --> 00:17:45.266 line:90%,end
There's nothing to make me run away

00:17:45.266 --> 00:17:47.116 line:90%,end
from it, like, right now, but I would

00:17:47.116 --> 00:17:48.716 line:90%,end
be watching this very carefully.

00:17:48.716 --> 00:17:53.026 line:90%,end
Like, I think that this really just lit

00:17:53.026 --> 00:17:55.706 line:90%,end
a huge spotlight on what things look

00:17:55.706 --> 00:17:57.606 line:90%,end
like internally at Proton, which we've

00:17:57.606 --> 00:18:00.086 line:90%,end
never quite seen before, and I don't think

00:18:00.086 --> 00:18:01.986 line:90%,end
people really like it because it looks

00:18:01.986 --> 00:18:04.616 line:90%,end
so reminiscent of a big tech company.

00:18:04.616 --> 00:18:06.616 line:90%,end
I don't think this is an immediate privacy

00:18:06.616 --> 00:18:09.046 line:90%,end
and security issue, but I think the whole

00:18:09.046 --> 00:18:10.896 line:90%,end
thing of, like, we need to stop being

00:18:10.896 --> 00:18:12.656 line:90%,end
as careful with what we push, and we need

00:18:12.656 --> 00:18:14.666 line:90%,end
to move faster is exactly what leads

00:18:14.666 --> 00:18:16.176 line:90%,end
to future security problems,

00:18:16.176 --> 00:18:17.226 line:90%,end
and that is something

00:18:17.226 --> 00:18:18.876 line:90%,end
that is very much worth watching.

00:18:18.876 --> 00:18:19.866 line:90%,end
And we need to make sure

00:18:19.866 --> 00:18:21.366 line:90%,end
that doesn't happen, and I think the kind

00:18:21.366 --> 00:18:23.366 line:90%,end
of pressure put on them was really good.

00:18:23.366 --> 00:18:24.786 line:90%,end
And also props to the employees

00:18:24.786 --> 00:18:26.636 line:90%,end
for standing up and saying something.

00:18:35.146 --> 00:18:36.116 line:90%,end
All right, everybody,

00:18:36.116 --> 00:18:37.466 line:90%,end
we have one more main story

00:18:37.466 --> 00:18:39.606 line:90%,end
before we get into the Defense Bulletin.

00:18:39.606 --> 00:18:40.966 line:90%,end
So this comes from Wired,

00:18:40.966 --> 00:18:42.766 line:90%,end
and pretty much the title is "The US

00:18:42.766 --> 00:18:44.816 line:90%,end
Government is Hiding a Secret Court Ruling

00:18:44.816 --> 00:18:46.466 line:90%,end
About How it Spies on Americans."

00:18:46.466 --> 00:18:48.416 line:90%,end
A lot of you listening already probably

00:18:48.416 --> 00:18:50.266 line:90%,end
know about FISA, which is this secret

00:18:50.266 --> 00:18:52.366 line:90%,end
courts that, i- i- you know,

00:18:52.366 --> 00:18:54.576 line:90%,end
it's kind of like people like the NSA kind

00:18:54.576 --> 00:18:56.246 line:90%,end
of tapping themselves on the back, like,

00:18:56.246 --> 00:18:57.806 line:90%,end
"Yeah, let's hold ourselves accountable

00:18:57.806 --> 00:18:59.356 line:90%,end
through a secret court that no one

00:18:59.356 --> 00:19:00.906 line:90%,end
can audit or see what happens."

00:19:00.906 --> 00:19:02.606 line:90%,end
And so this s- story really speaks

00:19:02.606 --> 00:19:04.386 line:90%,end
to that, and this was some of the stuff

00:19:04.386 --> 00:19:05.686 line:90%,end
that originally was leaked

00:19:05.686 --> 00:19:06.606 line:90%,end
by Edward Snowden.

00:19:06.606 --> 00:19:09.066 line:90%,end
So in March of 2026,

00:19:09.066 --> 00:19:11.126 line:90%,end
the FISA court ruled on searches

00:19:11.126 --> 00:19:13.626 line:90%,end
of data collected under Section 702,

00:19:13.626 --> 00:19:15.946 line:90%,end
and it found that the agency's filtering

00:19:15.946 --> 00:19:18.046 line:90%,end
tools for finding Americans' messages were

00:19:18.046 --> 00:19:20.826 line:90%,end
effectively just searches of Americans,

00:19:20.826 --> 00:19:22.906 line:90%,end
so they have to meet legal limits.

00:19:22.906 --> 00:19:24.826 line:90%,end
Reportedly, that means approvals,

00:19:24.826 --> 00:19:26.586 line:90%,end
written jurisdiction and records,

00:19:26.586 --> 00:19:29.186 line:90%,end
and the court ordered the tools rebuilt.

00:19:29.186 --> 00:19:32.526 line:90%,end
But despite this, they still renewed

00:19:33.854 --> 00:19:35.914 line:90%,end
Another year of 702 surveillance,

00:19:35.914 --> 00:19:38.104 line:90%,end
which runs until March 2027.

00:19:38.104 --> 00:19:39.414 line:90%,end
So they found these problems, but they

00:19:39.414 --> 00:19:41.234 line:90%,end
said, "Yeah, we're gonna renew anyway."

00:19:41.234 --> 00:19:42.834 line:90%,end
What's frustrating is the actual

00:19:42.834 --> 00:19:45.554 line:90%,end
opinion still hasn't been released,

00:19:45.554 --> 00:19:47.334 line:90%,end
so we have Senators Ron Wyden

00:19:47.334 --> 00:19:49.334 line:90%,end
and Schiff say the administration missed

00:19:49.334 --> 00:19:51.234 line:90%,end
its September deadline to release it.

00:19:51.234 --> 00:19:52.834 line:90%,end
They had demanded an explanation

00:19:52.834 --> 00:19:54.084 line:90%,end
from the attorney general

00:19:54.084 --> 00:19:56.094 line:90%,end
and the DNI by November 6th,

00:19:56.094 --> 00:19:59.254 line:90%,end
and nothing public shows a reply yet.

00:19:59.254 --> 00:20:00.734 line:90%,end
So now we have the ACLU,

00:20:00.734 --> 00:20:03.174 line:90%,end
we have Demand Progress, we have 21 other

00:20:03.174 --> 00:20:05.934 line:90%,end
groups urging Congress not to reauthorize

00:20:05.934 --> 00:20:08.834 line:90%,end
702 until the ruling is actually out.

00:20:08.834 --> 00:20:10.794 line:90%,end
It's, it's just a very frustrating

00:20:10.794 --> 00:20:13.254 line:90%,end
situation to be in, where even though

00:20:13.254 --> 00:20:15.144 line:90%,end
this is all kind of kept under wraps,

00:20:15.144 --> 00:20:16.994 line:90%,end
what's leaked is still making it look

00:20:16.994 --> 00:20:18.564 line:90%,end
really bad, even though it's things

00:20:18.564 --> 00:20:20.294 line:90%,end
we all already know are happening.

00:20:20.294 --> 00:20:21.694 line:90%,end
And it's just so frustrating

00:20:21.694 --> 00:20:23.494 line:90%,end
that now we have so much information

00:20:23.494 --> 00:20:25.504 line:90%,end
showing just how wrong this kind of, um,

00:20:25.504 --> 00:20:27.534 line:90%,end
oversight and surveillance is over people

00:20:27.534 --> 00:20:29.264 line:90%,end
that aren't supposed to be surveilled,

00:20:29.264 --> 00:20:31.154 line:90%,end
with literally no awareness of it,

00:20:31.154 --> 00:20:32.274 line:90%,end
all kept in secret.

00:20:32.274 --> 00:20:34.304 line:90%,end
And this is why people don't trust,

00:20:34.304 --> 00:20:35.234 line:90%,end
you know, the government

00:20:35.234 --> 00:20:36.384 line:90%,end
for this kind of stuff.

00:20:36.384 --> 00:20:39.574 line:90%,end
Like it, it's just such a, it's just such

00:20:39.574 --> 00:20:43.074 line:90%,end
a bad long-term play, and I am hopeful,

00:20:43.274 --> 00:20:44.674 line:90%,end
um, that we see a little bit

00:20:44.674 --> 00:20:46.704 line:90%,end
more pressure come as time goes on.

00:20:46.704 --> 00:20:47.754 line:90%,end
Contact your senators

00:20:47.754 --> 00:20:49.004 line:90%,end
and your representatives,

00:20:49.004 --> 00:20:50.074 line:90%,end
and just be like,

00:20:50.074 --> 00:20:53.284 line:90%,end
"Hey, I want some accountability for 702,

00:20:53.284 --> 00:20:54.734 line:90%,end
and I want you to act on it."

00:20:54.734 --> 00:20:56.464 line:90%,end
Especially since we've just had elections,

00:20:56.464 --> 00:20:58.414 line:90%,end
and it feels like there's a lot of, um,

00:20:58.414 --> 00:21:00.304 line:90%,end
promises that are being made from both

00:21:00.304 --> 00:21:02.354 line:90%,end
sides right now of the political spectrum

00:21:02.354 --> 00:21:03.954 line:90%,end
as to what they're doing to kind

00:21:03.954 --> 00:21:05.624 line:90%,end
of cater to the American people.

00:21:05.624 --> 00:21:07.624 line:90%,end
Now's our chance to really step forward,

00:21:07.624 --> 00:21:08.994 line:90%,end
contact those reps,

00:21:08.994 --> 00:21:10.634 line:90%,end
and see what we can get done.

00:21:19.014 --> 00:21:20.694 line:90%,end
All right, everybody, now we're gonna

00:21:20.694 --> 00:21:22.134 line:90%,end
get into the Defense Bulletin.

00:21:22.134 --> 00:21:24.034 line:90%,end
These are just quicker stories between

00:21:24.034 --> 00:21:26.334 line:90%,end
the data breaches of the last several

00:21:26.334 --> 00:21:28.634 line:90%,end
weeks, um, the threats of the last several

00:21:28.634 --> 00:21:30.634 line:90%,end
weeks, which are a lot, so I'm gonna try

00:21:30.634 --> 00:21:32.114 line:90%,end
to consolidate a little bit,

00:21:32.514 --> 00:21:33.864 line:90%,end
and the open source updates

00:21:33.864 --> 00:21:35.264 line:90%,end
from the last several weeks.

00:21:35.264 --> 00:21:36.954 line:90%,end
So we're gonna start with the first data

00:21:36.954 --> 00:21:38.594 line:90%,end
breach here, which is just security flaws

00:21:38.594 --> 00:21:40.254 line:90%,end
that were found across UK government

00:21:40.254 --> 00:21:42.254 line:90%,end
sites, which exposed what the researcher

00:21:42.254 --> 00:21:43.784 line:90%,end
calls god tier information.

00:21:43.784 --> 00:21:44.974 line:90%,end
The most interesting thing

00:21:44.974 --> 00:21:46.824 line:90%,end
about this is that it was found using

00:21:46.824 --> 00:21:49.494 line:90%,end
just a regular laptop and Claude's Opus

00:21:49.494 --> 00:21:51.424 line:90%,end
and Sonnet AI models, and he just said

00:21:51.424 --> 00:21:52.724 line:90%,end
that this should've been caught

00:21:52.724 --> 00:21:54.174 line:90%,end
by a routine IT health check,

00:21:54.174 --> 00:21:55.574 line:90%,end
and none of this is the level

00:21:55.574 --> 00:21:57.124 line:90%,end
of sophistication the general media's

00:21:57.124 --> 00:21:59.074 line:90%,end
worried about in terms of cyberattacks.

00:21:59.074 --> 00:22:00.374 line:90%,end
If you're in the UK, I'd recommend

00:22:00.374 --> 00:22:02.214 line:90%,end
seeing what exactly was impacted here,

00:22:02.214 --> 00:22:03.614 line:90%,end
but the main takeaway I have

00:22:03.614 --> 00:22:05.564 line:90%,end
is that there's this big push right now

00:22:05.564 --> 00:22:07.464 line:90%,end
to take things off of open source,

00:22:07.464 --> 00:22:09.514 line:90%,end
and I'm a bit concerned about that trend,

00:22:09.514 --> 00:22:10.764 line:90%,end
because there's this idea

00:22:10.764 --> 00:22:12.014 line:90%,end
that because our code is out there

00:22:12.014 --> 00:22:13.194 line:90%,end
and it's poorly maintained,

00:22:13.194 --> 00:22:14.634 line:90%,end
and because it's in the open, it's easy

00:22:14.634 --> 00:22:16.334 line:90%,end
to find all these vulnerabilities.

00:22:16.334 --> 00:22:18.334 line:90%,end
But I also think that theoretically we

00:22:18.334 --> 00:22:19.774 line:90%,end
can flip it around and say,

00:22:19.774 --> 00:22:21.984 line:90%,end
"Well, like, use AI to find

00:22:21.984 --> 00:22:23.754 line:90%,end
the vulnerabilities and patch them."

00:22:23.754 --> 00:22:24.034 line:90%,end
You know?

00:22:24.034 --> 00:22:25.684 line:90%,end
Like, it goes the other way, too.

00:22:25.684 --> 00:22:27.244 line:90%,end
And so I, I hope that not too

00:22:27.244 --> 00:22:28.894 line:90%,end
many people subscribe to this way

00:22:28.894 --> 00:22:30.844 line:90%,end
of thinking and instead see it as a way

00:22:30.844 --> 00:22:32.714 line:90%,end
to make their stuff even more secure.

00:22:32.714 --> 00:22:33.934 line:90%,end
Up next, lab testing.

00:22:33.934 --> 00:22:35.984 line:90%,end
Quest Diagnostics has confirmed

00:22:35.984 --> 00:22:37.134 line:90%,end
that patients' personal

00:22:37.134 --> 00:22:38.974 line:90%,end
and health data was compromised.

00:22:38.974 --> 00:22:41.494 line:90%,end
What's unfortunate is there is, like,

00:22:41.494 --> 00:22:45.314 line:90%,end
absolutely no information whatsoever.

00:22:45.534 --> 00:22:47.854 line:90%,end
There is not a specified amount

00:22:47.854 --> 00:22:49.914 line:90%,end
of patients that were impacted.

00:22:49.914 --> 00:22:51.774 line:90%,end
There isn't overall,

00:22:51.774 --> 00:22:53.794 line:90%,end
like, any assessment on who caused it

00:22:53.794 --> 00:22:56.274 line:90%,end
or what exactly was taken.

00:22:56.574 --> 00:22:57.874 line:90%,end
Uh, there's nothing.

00:22:57.874 --> 00:23:00.224 line:90%,end
But I, I guess follow this for updates,

00:23:00.224 --> 00:23:01.874 line:90%,end
because I, I don't know what else

00:23:01.874 --> 00:23:02.884 line:90%,end
to say to, to this.

00:23:02.884 --> 00:23:04.034 line:90%,end
And Quest should really

00:23:04.034 --> 00:23:04.934 line:90%,end
get their act together

00:23:04.934 --> 00:23:06.524 line:90%,end
and actually publish what they know.

00:23:06.524 --> 00:23:08.904 line:90%,end
Chainalysis has a very bad reputation,

00:23:08.904 --> 00:23:10.574 line:90%,end
especially in the cryptocurrency world,

00:23:10.574 --> 00:23:12.124 line:90%,end
because this company is just an

00:23:12.124 --> 00:23:15.134 line:90%,end
intelligence firm that just traces

00:23:15.134 --> 00:23:16.684 line:90%,end
transactions on the blockchain.

00:23:16.684 --> 00:23:18.434 line:90%,end
So these are people that have tried

00:23:18.434 --> 00:23:20.054 line:90%,end
to trace Monero transactions,

00:23:20.054 --> 00:23:21.654 line:90%,end
Bitcoin transactions, et cetera.

00:23:21.654 --> 00:23:23.634 line:90%,end
And this data breach led to their customer

00:23:23.634 --> 00:23:25.174 line:90%,end
list, including law enforcement,

00:23:25.174 --> 00:23:26.174 line:90%,end
government agencies,

00:23:26.174 --> 00:23:27.324 line:90%,end
financial institutions,

00:23:27.324 --> 00:23:29.274 line:90%,end
insurance companies, and cryptocurrency

00:23:29.274 --> 00:23:31.184 line:90%,end
businesses worldwide to be leaked.

00:23:31.184 --> 00:23:33.134 line:90%,end
In the world of cryptocurrency, we also

00:23:33.134 --> 00:23:35.974 line:90%,end
had Binance that had their $6.3 billion

00:23:35.974 --> 00:23:39.144 line:90%,end
stolen from Binance in a big crypto heist.

00:23:39.144 --> 00:23:40.714 line:90%,end
Um, this one has already been covered

00:23:40.714 --> 00:23:42.464 line:90%,end
a lot, even in mainstream news, and

00:23:42.464 --> 00:23:44.564 line:90%,end
so I don't necessarily want to repeat it.

00:23:44.564 --> 00:23:46.234 line:90%,end
And so if you haven't already read

00:23:46.234 --> 00:23:47.794 line:90%,end
the story, as always, you can check out

00:23:47.794 --> 00:23:49.644 line:90%,end
the show notes if you wanna learn more.

00:23:49.644 --> 00:23:51.593 line:90%,end
They should have already or are close

00:23:51.593 --> 00:23:52.893 line:90%,end
to finishing reimbursement

00:23:52.893 --> 00:23:54.663 line:90%,end
of all the funds, because apparently

00:23:54.663 --> 00:23:56.274 line:90%,end
Binance is just that rich.

00:23:56.274 --> 00:23:58.554 line:90%,end
The Japanese gaming giant Capcom

00:23:58.554 --> 00:24:00.084 line:90%,end
has confirmed a data breach

00:24:00.084 --> 00:24:02.034 line:90%,end
that affected over 11 million accounts.

00:24:02.034 --> 00:24:04.054 line:90%,end
Actually, almost 12 million accounts.

00:24:04.054 --> 00:24:05.494 line:90%,end
Um, this included emails,

00:24:05.494 --> 00:24:06.694 line:90%,end
account creation dates,

00:24:06.694 --> 00:24:08.694 line:90%,end
last login timestamps, number of logins,

00:24:08.694 --> 00:24:11.144 line:90%,end
and the IP address used at the last login.

00:24:11.144 --> 00:24:12.734 line:90%,end
They also found a smaller subset

00:24:12.734 --> 00:24:14.294 line:90%,end
of 43 accounts, which included date

00:24:14.294 --> 00:24:15.604 line:90%,end
of birth, gender, nicknames,

00:24:15.604 --> 00:24:17.454 line:90%,end
and countries that were also exposed,

00:24:17.454 --> 00:24:19.694 line:90%,end
and for another subset that included

00:24:19.694 --> 00:24:21.404 line:90%,end
ID login passwords in an attempt

00:24:21.404 --> 00:24:23.354 line:90%,end
to lock the owners out, but the company

00:24:23.354 --> 00:24:25.134 line:90%,end
took action and reset them.

00:24:25.134 --> 00:24:26.734 line:90%,end
So if you have a Capcom account,

00:24:26.734 --> 00:24:28.434 line:90%,end
make sure to look into this story.

00:24:28.434 --> 00:24:30.074 line:90%,end
Similarly, we have Sega,

00:24:30.074 --> 00:24:32.174 line:90%,end
who has their own data breach that exposed

00:24:32.174 --> 00:24:33.764 line:90%,end
over two million email addresses,

00:24:33.764 --> 00:24:35.714 line:90%,end
which is another Japanese gaming giant.

00:24:35.714 --> 00:24:37.734 line:90%,end
They're still investigating this one,

00:24:37.734 --> 00:24:39.774 line:90%,end
but it at least includes,

00:24:39.774 --> 00:24:41.074 line:90%,end
um, those email addresses,

00:24:41.074 --> 00:24:42.754 line:90%,end
and it seems like there's indication

00:24:42.754 --> 00:24:44.594 line:90%,end
that there could potentially be more.

00:24:44.594 --> 00:24:46.194 line:90%,end
So make sure to look into this if you

00:24:46.194 --> 00:24:47.694 line:90%,end
have anything related to Sega.

00:24:47.694 --> 00:24:48.664 line:90%,end
We're gonna now head

00:24:48.664 --> 00:24:49.944 line:90%,end
into the threats section.

00:24:49.944 --> 00:24:51.694 line:90%,end
So the first one is a vulnerability

00:24:51.694 --> 00:24:53.294 line:90%,end
that lets hackers SSH into Linux

00:24:53.294 --> 00:24:55.574 line:90%,end
devices under active exploitation,

00:24:55.574 --> 00:24:56.594 line:90%,end
and it's called,

00:24:56.954 --> 00:25:01.134 line:90%,end
uh, it's asterisk-asterisk S-S-H-O-L-E,

00:25:01.134 --> 00:25:02.394 line:90%,end
so it's like asshole,

00:25:02.394 --> 00:25:04.694 line:90%,end
but with the A as an asterisk,

00:25:04.694 --> 00:25:06.474 line:90%,end
so it's S-S hole.

00:25:06.474 --> 00:25:07.974 line:90%,end
This really hits things

00:25:07.974 --> 00:25:09.634 line:90%,end
especially running Alpine Linux.

00:25:09.634 --> 00:25:11.874 line:90%,end
And so if you have any servers already,

00:25:12.254 --> 00:25:13.574 line:90%,end
I, I would just really look into this one.

00:25:13.574 --> 00:25:15.254 line:90%,end
This is something to look into, especially

00:25:15.254 --> 00:25:17.134 line:90%,end
if you do any kind of hosting on your end.

00:25:17.134 --> 00:25:19.134 line:90%,end
Germany has said that lawmakers' iPhones

00:25:19.134 --> 00:25:20.834 line:90%,end
may have been hacked with spyware,

00:25:20.834 --> 00:25:22.414 line:90%,end
and they are just warning politicians

00:25:22.414 --> 00:25:23.214 line:90%,end
and public figures.

00:25:23.214 --> 00:25:24.124 line:90%,end
This is nothing new.

00:25:24.124 --> 00:25:25.774 line:90%,end
We've actually already seen this.

00:25:26.014 --> 00:25:26.954 line:90%,end
Apple sends these kind

00:25:26.954 --> 00:25:28.014 line:90%,end
of threat notifications,

00:25:28.014 --> 00:25:29.544 line:90%,end
which if you're watching the video you can

00:25:29.544 --> 00:25:31.624 line:90%,end
see on-screen, um, and this is their way

00:25:31.624 --> 00:25:32.774 line:90%,end
of alerting you that...

00:25:32.774 --> 00:25:33.874 line:90%,end
And you should take it seriously.

00:25:33.874 --> 00:25:35.114 line:90%,end
If you ever get this, please take it

00:25:35.114 --> 00:25:36.494 line:90%,end
seriously and reach out to some kind

00:25:36.494 --> 00:25:38.244 line:90%,end
of digital rights, uh, organization

00:25:38.244 --> 00:25:39.964 line:90%,end
or cybersecurity organization,

00:25:39.964 --> 00:25:41.314 line:90%,end
uh, to take this seriously.

00:25:41.314 --> 00:25:42.574 line:90%,end
But it's just kind of a warning

00:25:42.574 --> 00:25:43.774 line:90%,end
from Germany about them.

00:25:43.774 --> 00:25:47.674 line:90%,end
Synology warns of the C3RB3R ransomware

00:25:47.674 --> 00:25:49.934 line:90%,end
attack, which is targeting NAS devices.

00:25:49.934 --> 00:25:52.382 line:90%,end
This isn't as- Big of a deal as it sounds

00:25:52.382 --> 00:25:54.862 line:90%,end
because this, uh, comes from an outdated

00:25:54.862 --> 00:25:56.922 line:90%,end
version of DSM with a vulnerability

00:25:56.922 --> 00:25:58.962 line:90%,end
that was patched in December of 2024.

00:25:58.962 --> 00:26:00.462 line:90%,end
So this is just your reminder,

00:26:00.462 --> 00:26:03.142 line:90%,end
if you haven't patched DSM since December

00:26:03.142 --> 00:26:06.182 line:90%,end
of 2024, which is the OS that runs...

00:26:06.182 --> 00:26:07.482 line:90%,end
Uh, do they call it an OS?

00:26:07.482 --> 00:26:09.582 line:90%,end
I guess I c- I, I kind of see it as an OS.

00:26:09.582 --> 00:26:10.462 line:90%,end
So someone can tell me

00:26:10.462 --> 00:26:12.522 line:90%,end
if DSM is technically an operating system.

00:26:12.522 --> 00:26:14.192 line:90%,end
Guys, keep your devices up to date.

00:26:14.192 --> 00:26:15.712 line:90%,end
This is a very avoidable one,

00:26:15.712 --> 00:26:17.162 line:90%,end
um, if any of you have a NAS.

00:26:17.162 --> 00:26:20.002 line:90%,end
Next, this is a PSA from almost a month

00:26:20.002 --> 00:26:22.202 line:90%,end
ago now to just patch your Plex media

00:26:22.202 --> 00:26:24.982 line:90%,end
server before someone hacks it as a result

00:26:24.982 --> 00:26:27.122 line:90%,end
of some pretty severe vulnerabilities,

00:26:27.122 --> 00:26:28.892 line:90%,end
specifically called PlexToShell.

00:26:28.892 --> 00:26:30.142 line:90%,end
So if you haven't already

00:26:30.142 --> 00:26:31.762 line:90%,end
patched this, please do.

00:26:31.762 --> 00:26:32.922 line:90%,end
The next couple stories

00:26:32.922 --> 00:26:36.372 line:90%,end
are iOS/macOS-specific exploits.

00:26:36.372 --> 00:26:38.322 line:90%,end
One of them actually came from Binance,

00:26:38.322 --> 00:26:39.802 line:90%,end
which found a vulnerability,

00:26:40.022 --> 00:26:46.062 line:90%,end
um, in iOS 26.7.1, 27.0.1, and 27.2,

00:26:46.062 --> 00:26:48.842 line:90%,end
and also there was a, the core graphics,

00:26:48.842 --> 00:26:50.182 line:90%,end
uh, exploit as well.

00:26:50.182 --> 00:26:51.782 line:90%,end
I'm just gonna use these stories

00:26:51.782 --> 00:26:52.962 line:90%,end
as a reminder to update

00:26:52.962 --> 00:26:54.912 line:90%,end
to the latest versions of iOS and macOS

00:26:54.912 --> 00:26:56.162 line:90%,end
because now we have established

00:26:56.162 --> 00:26:57.562 line:90%,end
vulnerabilities on everything.

00:26:57.562 --> 00:26:59.512 line:90%,end
And so you don't have to go all the way

00:26:59.512 --> 00:27:01.842 line:90%,end
to iOS and macOS 27 to still get

00:27:01.842 --> 00:27:04.162 line:90%,end
the security updates on version 26.

00:27:04.162 --> 00:27:05.942 line:90%,end
So either way, update to the latest

00:27:05.942 --> 00:27:07.982 line:90%,end
versions whether you stay on 26 or 27.

00:27:07.982 --> 00:27:09.902 line:90%,end
Tailscale is a service I use.

00:27:09.902 --> 00:27:12.192 line:90%,end
It's a software-defined

00:27:12.192 --> 00:27:13.642 line:90%,end
mesh virtual private network.

00:27:13.642 --> 00:27:15.022 line:90%,end
Essentially, it lets you connect between

00:27:15.022 --> 00:27:16.872 line:90%,end
your devices and servers and whatever

00:27:16.872 --> 00:27:19.192 line:90%,end
you want to be on your, uh, network.

00:27:19.192 --> 00:27:20.542 line:90%,end
Um, and it's also integrated

00:27:20.542 --> 00:27:21.362 line:90%,end
with Mullvad, so you

00:27:21.362 --> 00:27:22.842 line:90%,end
can also have Mullvad route through it.

00:27:22.842 --> 00:27:24.042 line:90%,end
I really like Tailscale,

00:27:24.042 --> 00:27:25.642 line:90%,end
but they did have an SSH flaw

00:27:25.642 --> 00:27:27.592 line:90%,end
that allowed root privilege escalation.

00:27:27.592 --> 00:27:29.022 line:90%,end
By the time you listen to this, it

00:27:29.022 --> 00:27:30.322 line:90%,end
should already be patched,

00:27:30.322 --> 00:27:32.582 line:90%,end
so just make sure that you are running

00:27:32.582 --> 00:27:34.682 line:90%,end
the latest versions that patch this issue.

00:27:34.682 --> 00:27:36.152 line:90%,end
All right, everybody, and now we're gonna

00:27:36.152 --> 00:27:38.082 line:90%,end
get into the open source stories,

00:27:38.082 --> 00:27:40.462 line:90%,end
and there are also a lot here, um,

00:27:40.462 --> 00:27:42.562 line:90%,end
so I will try my best to get through them.

00:27:42.562 --> 00:27:44.122 line:90%,end
So the first one is that Tor Browser's

00:27:44.122 --> 00:27:45.972 line:90%,end
had some updates since we last spoke,

00:27:45.972 --> 00:27:49.132 line:90%,end
including version, uh, 16.0.1, which has

00:27:49.132 --> 00:27:50.962 line:90%,end
some minor improvements, so just make sure

00:27:50.962 --> 00:27:52.882 line:90%,end
that Tor is running the latest version.

00:27:52.882 --> 00:27:53.972 line:90%,end
Same thing with Tails,

00:27:53.972 --> 00:27:55.622 line:90%,end
which hit version 7.17.

00:27:55.622 --> 00:27:58.302 line:90%,end
That is the ephemeral, uh, Tor-routed,

00:27:58.302 --> 00:28:00.182 line:90%,end
uh, operating system, and so make

00:28:00.182 --> 00:28:02.042 line:90%,end
sure you're updating that as well.

00:28:02.042 --> 00:28:03.892 line:90%,end
Mullvad Browser hit version 16,

00:28:03.892 --> 00:28:05.992 line:90%,end
which incorporates the first release based

00:28:05.992 --> 00:28:08.622 line:90%,end
on Firefox ESR 153 and incorporates

00:28:08.622 --> 00:28:10.242 line:90%,end
a year's worth of changes.

00:28:10.242 --> 00:28:12.342 line:90%,end
This version also includes Quad9

00:28:12.342 --> 00:28:14.342 line:90%,end
as a default encrypted DNS because

00:28:14.342 --> 00:28:16.152 line:90%,end
Mullvad discontinued encrypted DNS,

00:28:16.152 --> 00:28:17.952 line:90%,end
which I made a whole dedicated video

00:28:17.952 --> 00:28:19.152 line:90%,end
about kind of explaining

00:28:19.152 --> 00:28:20.652 line:90%,end
what that is and what it looks

00:28:20.652 --> 00:28:22.902 line:90%,end
like, and so that's a big update as well.

00:28:22.902 --> 00:28:24.412 line:90%,end
Which is, uh, window titles,

00:28:24.412 --> 00:28:26.362 line:90%,end
and so it'll actually change the window

00:28:26.362 --> 00:28:28.402 line:90%,end
titles instead of summarizing the webpage

00:28:28.402 --> 00:28:30.152 line:90%,end
that you're on, which theoretically

00:28:30.152 --> 00:28:32.462 line:90%,end
other pieces of software could snoop on.

00:28:32.462 --> 00:28:34.362 line:90%,end
Um, you can actually protect that now,

00:28:34.362 --> 00:28:36.742 line:90%,end
but it is opt-in because they cite some

00:28:36.742 --> 00:28:38.882 line:90%,end
usability and accessibility issues.

00:28:38.882 --> 00:28:40.882 line:90%,end
So you can opt into that if you want

00:28:40.882 --> 00:28:42.662 line:90%,end
in Settings, Privacy &amp; Security,

00:28:42.662 --> 00:28:44.212 line:90%,end
Connection &amp; Software Security,

00:28:44.212 --> 00:28:46.062 line:90%,end
Advanced Settings, and in Protections

00:28:46.062 --> 00:28:47.572 line:90%,end
from Third-Party Applications.

00:28:47.572 --> 00:28:49.282 line:90%,end
The last thing is that after a year

00:28:49.282 --> 00:28:51.282 line:90%,end
of testing, they now have native support

00:28:51.282 --> 00:28:53.402 line:90%,end
for Linux computers with 64-bit ARM

00:28:53.402 --> 00:28:55.722 line:90%,end
processors, like Apple Silicon Macs

00:28:55.722 --> 00:28:57.812 line:90%,end
running Linux and Raspberry Pis.

00:28:57.812 --> 00:28:59.262 line:90%,end
Thank you all for doing this.

00:28:59.262 --> 00:29:00.862 line:90%,end
We need more Linux ARM

00:29:00.862 --> 00:29:02.122 line:90%,end
support in my opinion.

00:29:02.122 --> 00:29:03.322 line:90%,end
Like, it is so bad right

00:29:03.322 --> 00:29:05.172 line:90%,end
now, still in 2026.

00:29:05.172 --> 00:29:07.122 line:90%,end
Um, and so we need more native support,

00:29:07.122 --> 00:29:07.962 line:90%,end
so thank you Mullvad

00:29:07.962 --> 00:29:09.212 line:90%,end
for hopping on the train.

00:29:09.212 --> 00:29:11.722 line:90%,end
This one is, uh, pretty damning,

00:29:11.722 --> 00:29:12.822 line:90%,end
I would say, actually.

00:29:12.822 --> 00:29:15.202 line:90%,end
So Molly is a fork of Signal,

00:29:15.202 --> 00:29:16.802 line:90%,end
and they try to add some privacy

00:29:16.802 --> 00:29:18.702 line:90%,end
and security enhancing features to it.

00:29:18.702 --> 00:29:20.182 line:90%,end
They also let you use it

00:29:20.182 --> 00:29:22.332 line:90%,end
as a linked device from the phone,

00:29:22.332 --> 00:29:24.382 line:90%,end
so theoretically can have a second phone.

00:29:24.382 --> 00:29:26.032 line:90%,end
Uh, overall, really cool project.

00:29:26.032 --> 00:29:27.202 line:90%,end
In fact, I've even made a review

00:29:27.202 --> 00:29:28.102 line:90%,end
of Molly on the channel

00:29:28.102 --> 00:29:29.712 line:90%,end
if you guys wanna learn more about it.

00:29:29.712 --> 00:29:31.162 line:90%,end
It's still on our tools page,

00:29:31.162 --> 00:29:33.102 line:90%,end
although I'm kind of reconsidering that.

00:29:33.102 --> 00:29:34.842 line:90%,end
But they have stopped updating Molly,

00:29:34.842 --> 00:29:36.052 line:90%,end
and it's gone three months

00:29:36.052 --> 00:29:38.112 line:90%,end
without updates, and they are now leaving

00:29:38.112 --> 00:29:39.962 line:90%,end
users exposed to some vulnerabilities

00:29:39.962 --> 00:29:41.622 line:90%,end
that Signal has already patched.

00:29:41.622 --> 00:29:43.242 line:90%,end
So even in the review I did,

00:29:43.242 --> 00:29:44.962 line:90%,end
I kind of warned about the kind

00:29:44.962 --> 00:29:47.622 line:90%,end
of concerns about using a third party

00:29:47.622 --> 00:29:49.742 line:90%,end
and using forked software and the kind

00:29:49.742 --> 00:29:51.042 line:90%,end
of reliance and dependency

00:29:51.042 --> 00:29:53.262 line:90%,end
that builds and why I'm generally

00:29:53.262 --> 00:29:55.132 line:90%,end
skeptical of, of this kind of stuff.

00:29:55.132 --> 00:29:56.382 line:90%,end
So it's always good to go

00:29:56.382 --> 00:29:57.552 line:90%,end
as upstream as you can

00:29:57.552 --> 00:29:59.202 line:90%,end
with your software in my opinion.

00:29:59.202 --> 00:30:00.842 line:90%,end
At least that's my philosophy,

00:30:00.842 --> 00:30:02.162 line:90%,end
and this is kind of why.

00:30:02.162 --> 00:30:05.192 line:90%,end
So I still have yet to see why this is.

00:30:05.192 --> 00:30:06.392 line:90%,end
I don't think they've made

00:30:06.392 --> 00:30:07.781 line:90%,end
a public comment about it.

00:30:07.781 --> 00:30:10.802 line:90%,end
So until we know more, I would

00:30:10.802 --> 00:30:12.712 line:90%,end
be very cautious about using Molly,

00:30:12.712 --> 00:30:14.462 line:90%,end
and I probably wouldn't be using it

00:30:14.462 --> 00:30:16.742 line:90%,end
until this is probably cleared up,

00:30:16.742 --> 00:30:18.082 line:90%,end
hopefully someday.

00:30:18.082 --> 00:30:19.892 line:90%,end
Delta Chat is something that's

00:30:19.892 --> 00:30:21.442 line:90%,end
making a lot more rounds recently.

00:30:21.442 --> 00:30:23.302 line:90%,end
It's an open source messenger that runs

00:30:23.302 --> 00:30:25.102 line:90%,end
over encrypted email infrastructure,

00:30:25.102 --> 00:30:26.942 line:90%,end
but they broke silence saying

00:30:26.942 --> 00:30:29.312 line:90%,end
that they are dropping unencrypted email,

00:30:29.312 --> 00:30:30.962 line:90%,end
and they have added decentralized

00:30:30.962 --> 00:30:33.142 line:90%,end
onboarding across community relays.

00:30:33.142 --> 00:30:35.222 line:90%,end
This is even cited as mirroring, uh,

00:30:35.222 --> 00:30:38.062 line:90%,end
Signal's 2022 removal of plain text SMS

00:30:38.062 --> 00:30:40.322 line:90%,end
and only doing encrypted messaging.

00:30:40.322 --> 00:30:41.572 line:90%,end
Um, they cite security,

00:30:41.572 --> 00:30:43.322 line:90%,end
uh, unencrypted email leaks content

00:30:43.322 --> 00:30:44.622 line:90%,end
and metadata to providers,

00:30:44.622 --> 00:30:46.562 line:90%,end
as well as the risk of confusing users

00:30:46.562 --> 00:30:49.212 line:90%,end
in a mixed secure, uh, insecure interface,

00:30:49.212 --> 00:30:51.162 line:90%,end
kind of like what Signal cited as well.

00:30:51.162 --> 00:30:52.192 line:90%,end
This one's pretty cool.

00:30:52.192 --> 00:30:54.242 line:90%,end
I did do a video, and I also interviewed,

00:30:54.242 --> 00:30:56.162 line:90%,end
um, some people on our sister podcast

00:30:56.162 --> 00:30:58.242 line:90%,end
from Firefox on their VPN feature,

00:30:58.242 --> 00:30:59.142 line:90%,end
like how it works,

00:30:59.142 --> 00:31:00.942 line:90%,end
the privacy implications, et cetera,

00:31:00.942 --> 00:31:03.052 line:90%,end
because now Firefox has a built-in VPN.

00:31:03.052 --> 00:31:05.102 line:90%,end
They straight up just said that they have

00:31:05.102 --> 00:31:07.292 line:90%,end
uncapped data limits through January 2027.

00:31:07.292 --> 00:31:09.042 line:90%,end
So if you're using the VPN feature,

00:31:09.042 --> 00:31:10.582 line:90%,end
like, built into Firefox,

00:31:10.582 --> 00:31:12.382 line:90%,end
not to be confused with Mozilla VPN,

00:31:12.382 --> 00:31:14.562 line:90%,end
which runs system-wide, just the Firefox

00:31:14.562 --> 00:31:17.192 line:90%,end
extension literally is free and unlimited.

00:31:17.192 --> 00:31:18.762 line:90%,end
So I, I think that's pretty darn sweet.

00:31:18.762 --> 00:31:20.422 line:90%,end
So, um, definitely it's something to get

00:31:20.422 --> 00:31:22.222 line:90%,end
your friends and family on, I think.

00:31:22.222 --> 00:31:23.032 line:90%,end
Um, I don't think it

00:31:23.032 --> 00:31:24.382 line:90%,end
replaces a system-wide VPN.

00:31:24.382 --> 00:31:25.122 line:90%,end
They don't even claim

00:31:25.122 --> 00:31:26.142 line:90%,end
that in the interview I did.

00:31:26.142 --> 00:31:27.942 line:90%,end
I think they were very, like, honest

00:31:27.942 --> 00:31:29.922 line:90%,end
about, like, who the feature is for.

00:31:29.922 --> 00:31:30.422 line:90%,end
All right.

00:31:30.422 --> 00:31:33.962 line:90%,end
KeePassXC version 2.8 has arrived with Qt

00:31:33.962 --> 00:31:36.582 line:90%,end
6 migration, Wayland autotype support,

00:31:36.582 --> 00:31:40.442 line:90%,end
and, drum roll, native ARM 64 builds.

00:31:40.442 --> 00:31:42.142 line:90%,end
Is this the year that, like, ARM

00:31:42.142 --> 00:31:43.852 line:90%,end
on Linux gets a lot better?

00:31:43.852 --> 00:31:44.702 line:90%,end
I think it might.

00:31:44.702 --> 00:31:46.382 line:90%,end
So, um, really big update

00:31:46.382 --> 00:31:47.782 line:90%,end
for anyone using KeePassXC.

00:31:47.782 --> 00:31:49.842 line:90%,end
Brave has added some new things to their

00:31:49.842 --> 00:31:52.062 line:90%,end
browser as well since we last spoke.

00:31:52.062 --> 00:31:54.242 line:90%,end
First, Leo now encrypts conversations

00:31:54.242 --> 00:31:56.102 line:90%,end
directly in the browser before they

00:31:56.102 --> 00:31:58.182 line:90%,end
leave the device with requests decrypted

00:31:58.182 --> 00:32:00.282 line:90%,end
and processed only inside verified trusted

00:32:00.282 --> 00:32:02.682 line:90%,end
execution environments using Intel TDX

00:32:02.682 --> 00:32:05.522 line:90%,end
and Nvidia confidential computing GPUs.

00:32:05.522 --> 00:32:07.842 line:90%,end
It sounds quite similar as, of a concept

00:32:07.842 --> 00:32:08.902 line:90%,end
of what Apple's doing

00:32:08.902 --> 00:32:11.840 line:90%,end
with, like, their like AI compute, private

00:32:11.840 --> 00:32:13.710 line:90%,end
compute servers, whatever they call them.

00:32:13.710 --> 00:32:15.510 line:90%,end
Conversation histories remain stored

00:32:15.510 --> 00:32:17.630 line:90%,end
locally with neither Brave nor Near

00:32:17.630 --> 00:32:19.670 line:90%,end
AI retaining chat on their servers.

00:32:19.670 --> 00:32:21.470 line:90%,end
They still say Leo continues to work

00:32:21.470 --> 00:32:22.970 line:90%,end
without an account while premium

00:32:22.970 --> 00:32:24.770 line:90%,end
subscriptions use unlinkable tokens,

00:32:24.770 --> 00:32:25.890 line:90%,end
which is really cool tech,

00:32:25.890 --> 00:32:26.970 line:90%,end
by the way, if you guys haven't read

00:32:26.970 --> 00:32:28.870 line:90%,end
into that, to separate payment details

00:32:28.870 --> 00:32:29.820 line:90%,end
from conversations.

00:32:29.820 --> 00:32:31.050 line:90%,end
They've published the source code

00:32:31.050 --> 00:32:32.430 line:90%,end
for the privacy pipeline, although

00:32:32.430 --> 00:32:34.330 line:90%,end
verification still depends on external

00:32:34.330 --> 00:32:36.230 line:90%,end
hardware and infrastructure providers.

00:32:36.230 --> 00:32:37.430 line:90%,end
The company plans to introduce

00:32:37.430 --> 00:32:39.030 line:90%,end
direct browser-side verification

00:32:39.030 --> 00:32:40.010 line:90%,end
in future updates.

00:32:40.010 --> 00:32:42.290 line:90%,end
So overall, really cool implementation,

00:32:42.290 --> 00:32:43.290 line:90%,end
and I'm pretty happy

00:32:43.290 --> 00:32:44.690 line:90%,end
with how they're doing this.

00:32:44.790 --> 00:32:46.190 line:90%,end
I've been using Leo a little

00:32:46.190 --> 00:32:48.290 line:90%,end
bit more, so I'm optimistic,

00:32:48.290 --> 00:32:49.830 line:90%,end
but the free Leo really sucks.

00:32:49.830 --> 00:32:52.430 line:90%,end
And actually, my offline LLM that I run

00:32:52.430 --> 00:32:54.030 line:90%,end
on my Mac Mini that I can access

00:32:54.030 --> 00:32:56.670 line:90%,end
through Tailscale is a better model

00:32:56.670 --> 00:32:58.950 line:90%,end
than what they default to in Leo.

00:32:58.950 --> 00:33:00.570 line:90%,end
So I actually find myself using

00:33:00.570 --> 00:33:02.810 line:90%,end
my local one more than Leo.

00:33:02.810 --> 00:33:04.320 line:90%,end
So anyway, just side note,

00:33:04.320 --> 00:33:05.830 line:90%,end
I guess I would just say you should

00:33:05.830 --> 00:33:07.860 line:90%,end
probably pay if you want the nicer models

00:33:07.860 --> 00:33:11.250 line:90%,end
from Brave or just use a local model.

00:33:11.250 --> 00:33:13.810 line:90%,end
This one came out of left field because

00:33:13.810 --> 00:33:16.270 line:90%,end
I don't want to say that Privacy Badger

00:33:16.270 --> 00:33:18.340 line:90%,end
has gone unmaintained because it has.

00:33:18.340 --> 00:33:19.890 line:90%,end
It's just that the EFF doesn't,

00:33:19.890 --> 00:33:21.290 line:90%,end
to me, seem to prioritize it

00:33:21.290 --> 00:33:22.490 line:90%,end
as much as they used to.

00:33:22.490 --> 00:33:24.540 line:90%,end
And then out of nowhere, the EFF launched

00:33:24.540 --> 00:33:27.310 line:90%,end
Privacy Badger for Safari on macOS.

00:33:27.310 --> 00:33:30.250 line:90%,end
So yeah, I guess you can get

00:33:30.810 --> 00:33:33.410 line:90%,end
this on Safari now, which is really cool.

00:33:33.410 --> 00:33:35.390 line:90%,end
I'm curious what the overlap is between

00:33:35.390 --> 00:33:38.190 line:90%,end
Privacy Badger and Safari's native privacy

00:33:38.190 --> 00:33:40.240 line:90%,end
protections or how this compares to using

00:33:40.240 --> 00:33:41.950 line:90%,end
AdGuard in Safari or how it compares

00:33:41.950 --> 00:33:43.850 line:90%,end
to using uBlock Origin Lite in Safari.

00:33:43.850 --> 00:33:45.950 line:90%,end
So those are kind of the questions I have.

00:33:46.310 --> 00:33:48.000 line:90%,end
But otherwise, I guess

00:33:48.000 --> 00:33:49.050 line:90%,end
there's no harm here.

00:33:49.050 --> 00:33:50.370 line:90%,end
If you're a fan of Privacy Badger,

00:33:50.370 --> 00:33:51.640 line:90%,end
that's another way to use it.

00:33:51.640 --> 00:33:53.590 line:90%,end
Immich, the self-hosted photo and video

00:33:53.590 --> 00:33:56.890 line:90%,end
management solution by FUTO has reached

00:33:56.890 --> 00:34:01.390 line:90%,end
version 3.3, which brings people sharing

00:34:01.390 --> 00:34:03.950 line:90%,end
birthday memories and a new OCR model

00:34:03.950 --> 00:34:05.670 line:90%,end
and synced OAuth claims.

00:34:05.670 --> 00:34:06.690 line:90%,end
So check it out.

00:34:06.690 --> 00:34:08.230 line:90%,end
Seems like some nice quality

00:34:08.230 --> 00:34:09.370 line:90%,end
of life improvements.

00:34:09.370 --> 00:34:10.910 line:90%,end
Speaking of Ente Photos,

00:34:10.910 --> 00:34:12.710 line:90%,end
which is like a more hosted version,

00:34:12.710 --> 00:34:14.520 line:90%,end
you actually can self-host Ente Photos

00:34:14.520 --> 00:34:16.730 line:90%,end
as well, but it also is better known

00:34:16.730 --> 00:34:18.369 line:90%,end
for their hosted solution.

00:34:18.369 --> 00:34:19.649 line:90%,end
They have a fresh look

00:34:19.649 --> 00:34:22.449 line:90%,end
with a mosaic layout and pinch gestures,

00:34:22.449 --> 00:34:23.570 line:90%,end
redesigned albums.

00:34:23.570 --> 00:34:24.679 line:90%,end
It looks really nice

00:34:24.679 --> 00:34:26.429 line:90%,end
if you guys are watching the video.

00:34:26.429 --> 00:34:27.620 line:90%,end
They have some more tools

00:34:27.620 --> 00:34:28.770 line:90%,end
in the image editor.

00:34:29.110 --> 00:34:31.310 line:90%,end
And so yeah, really good stuff all around

00:34:31.310 --> 00:34:33.409 line:90%,end
and good time to be an Ente user.

00:34:33.409 --> 00:34:35.409 line:90%,end
IVPN, which is one of my favorite VPN

00:34:35.409 --> 00:34:38.290 line:90%,end
providers, now has added split tunneling

00:34:38.290 --> 00:34:40.949 line:90%,end
for IVPN on macOS, which is historically

00:34:40.949 --> 00:34:43.050 line:90%,end
a harder OS to add split tunneling for.

00:34:43.050 --> 00:34:45.469 line:90%,end
But I think Mullvad, Proton,

00:34:45.469 --> 00:34:47.650 line:90%,end
and now IVPN have in some way, shape,

00:34:47.650 --> 00:34:50.570 line:90%,end
or form added it in their macOS clients.

00:34:50.570 --> 00:34:52.070 line:90%,end
So this is really nice to see.

00:34:52.070 --> 00:34:54.779 line:90%,end
Addy.io, which is an open source email

00:34:54.779 --> 00:34:56.429 line:90%,end
aliasing solution, has overhauled

00:34:56.429 --> 00:34:58.229 line:90%,end
their mobile apps with system search

00:34:58.229 --> 00:35:01.100 line:90%,end
integration, smaller app sizes, and more.

00:35:01.100 --> 00:35:02.850 line:90%,end
And so if you want to check it out,

00:35:02.850 --> 00:35:04.490 line:90%,end
go ahead and give them a shot.

00:35:04.490 --> 00:35:05.560 line:90%,end
They're free to try.

00:35:05.560 --> 00:35:06.650 line:90%,end
And they're even a previous

00:35:06.650 --> 00:35:07.650 line:90%,end
sponsor of Techlore.

00:35:07.650 --> 00:35:08.530 line:90%,end
I'm a big fan of what they're

00:35:08.530 --> 00:35:09.380 line:90%,end
doing over there.

00:35:09.380 --> 00:35:12.030 line:90%,end
LineageOS hit version 24, which brings

00:35:12.030 --> 00:35:14.580 line:90%,end
Android 17, new web USB flashing tools

00:35:14.580 --> 00:35:16.030 line:90%,end
to make it easier to install,

00:35:16.030 --> 00:35:17.850 line:90%,end
updated apps, and security patches.

00:35:17.850 --> 00:35:19.390 line:90%,end
So if any of you use LineageOS

00:35:19.390 --> 00:35:21.190 line:90%,end
or you use a ROM based on LineageOS,

00:35:21.190 --> 00:35:23.040 line:90%,end
you'll probably get updates for this.

00:35:23.040 --> 00:35:24.690 line:90%,end
And the final story of the week.

00:35:24.690 --> 00:35:27.610 line:90%,end
This is a very weird, quirky,

00:35:27.910 --> 00:35:30.870 line:90%,end
bizarre story to round out the week,

00:35:30.870 --> 00:35:32.320 line:90%,end
which is still positive news.

00:35:32.320 --> 00:35:33.410 line:90%,end
So I feel like it was kind

00:35:33.410 --> 00:35:34.840 line:90%,end
of the perfect way to end it.

00:35:34.840 --> 00:35:36.550 line:90%,end
But there's a new tool,

00:35:36.550 --> 00:35:38.930 line:90%,end
a new AI tool from Google DeepMind

00:35:38.930 --> 00:35:42.210 line:90%,end
that proved the Signal protocol is secure.

00:35:42.510 --> 00:35:44.570 line:90%,end
I don't know how much emphasis that we

00:35:44.570 --> 00:35:46.750 line:90%,end
want to put on this, but it's an agentic

00:35:46.750 --> 00:35:49.310 line:90%,end
AI that mathematically proves or formally

00:35:49.310 --> 00:35:51.230 line:90%,end
verifies that a number of the Signal

00:35:51.230 --> 00:35:53.340 line:90%,end
protocol's key cryptographic guarantees,

00:35:53.340 --> 00:35:54.810 line:90%,end
which is a landmark development

00:35:54.810 --> 00:35:56.260 line:90%,end
for the widely used cryptography

00:35:56.260 --> 00:35:58.430 line:90%,end
and AI itself, actually work as intended.

00:35:58.430 --> 00:36:00.750 line:90%,end
I do want to be clear here that like 90%

00:36:00.750 --> 00:36:03.630 line:90%,end
of this article is more about DeepMind

00:36:03.630 --> 00:36:05.510 line:90%,end
and the fact that they used a tool

00:36:05.510 --> 00:36:08.910 line:90%,end
to, I would say, audit the software.

00:36:09.430 --> 00:36:11.010 line:90%,end
It's less about Signal.

00:36:11.010 --> 00:36:11.810 line:90%,end
So I do want

00:36:11.810 --> 00:36:13.320 line:90%,end
to be very transparent about that.

00:36:13.320 --> 00:36:14.370 line:90%,end
But obviously my read

00:36:14.370 --> 00:36:16.300 line:90%,end
of this focuses on that 10%.

00:36:16.300 --> 00:36:18.050 line:90%,end
And I'm like very excited about it.

00:36:18.050 --> 00:36:19.710 line:90%,end
One of the quotes that was from Signal's

00:36:19.710 --> 00:36:21.710 line:90%,end
chief technology officer said that as AI

00:36:21.710 --> 00:36:23.720 line:90%,end
driven security threats grow, rigorously

00:36:23.720 --> 00:36:25.820 line:90%,end
verifying a Signal protocol implementation

00:36:25.820 --> 00:36:27.470 line:90%,end
gives us even greater confidence

00:36:27.470 --> 00:36:29.120 line:90%,end
in our code's privacy guarantees.

00:36:29.120 --> 00:36:30.700 line:90%,end
I feel like I've said this recently,

00:36:30.700 --> 00:36:32.550 line:90%,end
but I think it's just such a fun time

00:36:32.550 --> 00:36:33.930 line:90%,end
to be a Signal user on my end

00:36:33.930 --> 00:36:35.510 line:90%,end
because it wasn't that long ago.

00:36:35.510 --> 00:36:37.610 line:90%,end
Like if you were to like transport me back

00:36:37.610 --> 00:36:39.170 line:90%,end
in time three or four years

00:36:39.170 --> 00:36:40.770 line:90%,end
and you told me in five years,

00:36:40.770 --> 00:36:42.170 line:90%,end
Signal would have usernames.

00:36:42.170 --> 00:36:43.910 line:90%,end
It would let you hide the phone number

00:36:43.910 --> 00:36:45.160 line:90%,end
from all of your contacts

00:36:45.160 --> 00:36:46.370 line:90%,end
so they can't see it.

00:36:46.370 --> 00:36:48.270 line:90%,end
They would let you add more than one

00:36:48.270 --> 00:36:50.410 line:90%,end
phone now as a linked device.

00:36:50.410 --> 00:36:52.070 line:90%,end
They would even let you register

00:36:52.070 --> 00:36:53.670 line:90%,end
for a Signal account

00:36:53.670 --> 00:36:55.450 line:90%,end
without a phone number anymore.

00:36:56.010 --> 00:36:57.260 line:90%,end
I guess with the asterisk

00:36:57.260 --> 00:36:59.160 line:90%,end
of you needing to pay Apple or Google,

00:36:59.160 --> 00:37:00.260 line:90%,end
which I hope they fix.

00:37:00.260 --> 00:37:01.600 line:90%,end
But either way, the fact they

00:37:01.600 --> 00:37:02.890 line:90%,end
even made that possible.

00:37:02.890 --> 00:37:04.290 line:90%,end
And now you can do fully end

00:37:04.290 --> 00:37:05.490 line:90%,end
to end encrypted backups

00:37:05.490 --> 00:37:07.150 line:90%,end
through the cloud or they have

00:37:07.150 --> 00:37:09.240 line:90%,end
a compatible format across all devices.

00:37:09.240 --> 00:37:10.790 line:90%,end
So you can like export a backup

00:37:10.790 --> 00:37:12.660 line:90%,end
from iOS and import it into Android.

00:37:12.660 --> 00:37:14.510 line:90%,end
Like all these things five years ago,

00:37:14.510 --> 00:37:15.730 line:90%,end
I'm like, why isn't this fixed?

00:37:15.730 --> 00:37:16.720 line:90%,end
And for them to actually

00:37:16.720 --> 00:37:18.150 line:90%,end
have done all this, I'm just

00:37:18.950 --> 00:37:19.900 line:90%,end
it feels good, man.

00:37:19.900 --> 00:37:21.490 line:90%,end
So I just wanted to give them, I guess,

00:37:21.490 --> 00:37:23.170 line:90%,end
some props because it's really cool to see

00:37:23.170 --> 00:37:24.930 line:90%,end
developments in the last five years.

00:37:24.930 --> 00:37:26.650 line:90%,end
And I know that they don't work maybe

00:37:26.650 --> 00:37:28.270 line:90%,end
the fastest and they still have problems

00:37:28.270 --> 00:37:30.210 line:90%,end
that I still complain about to this day.

00:37:30.210 --> 00:37:32.190 line:90%,end
But I always like to like look back five

00:37:32.190 --> 00:37:33.570 line:90%,end
years ago and say, what would I think

00:37:33.570 --> 00:37:35.190 line:90%,end
about if you told me this five years ago?

00:37:35.190 --> 00:37:36.070 line:90%,end
And I think I would have been

00:37:36.070 --> 00:37:37.320 line:90%,end
really excited, actually.

00:37:37.320 --> 00:37:39.010 line:90%,end
So this is also my reminder

00:37:39.010 --> 00:37:40.450 line:90%,end
to stay optimistic

00:37:40.450 --> 00:37:42.150 line:90%,end
about the tools we have access to.

00:37:42.150 --> 00:37:43.230 line:90%,end
All right, everybody.

00:37:43.230 --> 00:37:45.070 line:90%,end
I am now at like 75 minutes

00:37:45.070 --> 00:37:46.450 line:90%,end
of the recording session.

00:37:46.450 --> 00:37:48.700 line:90%,end
So it's been a longer recording session.

00:37:48.700 --> 00:37:49.600 line:90%,end
Hopefully I'm able

00:37:49.600 --> 00:37:51.230 line:90%,end
to trim this down a little bit.

00:37:51.230 --> 00:37:52.730 line:90%,end
Final notice is that we have

00:37:52.730 --> 00:37:54.130 line:90%,end
already released section two

00:37:54.130 --> 00:37:56.450 line:90%,end
of Go Incognito for our premium users.

00:37:56.450 --> 00:37:58.990 line:90%,end
That's V2 of Go Incognito, which takes you

00:37:58.990 --> 00:38:00.830 line:90%,end
from the beginning all the way

00:38:00.830 --> 00:38:02.770 line:90%,end
to where you need to go to make

00:38:02.770 --> 00:38:04.570 line:90%,end
yourself private, secure, anonymous.

00:38:04.570 --> 00:38:06.190 line:90%,end
The goal is for you to leave the course

00:38:06.190 --> 00:38:07.550 line:90%,end
just feeling much more in control

00:38:07.550 --> 00:38:08.580 line:90%,end
of your digital life.

00:38:08.580 --> 00:38:10.590 line:90%,end
So if you want just this really in-depth

00:38:10.590 --> 00:38:12.750 line:90%,end
experience that takes you from like zero

00:38:12.750 --> 00:38:14.570 line:90%,end
to hero, I don't have a better place

00:38:14.570 --> 00:38:15.510 line:90%,end
to send you guys.

00:38:15.510 --> 00:38:16.710 line:90%,end
I wholeheartedly believe

00:38:16.710 --> 00:38:18.440 line:90%,end
that the amount of work, which is years

00:38:18.440 --> 00:38:19.840 line:90%,end
that goes into this project,

00:38:19.840 --> 00:38:21.610 line:90%,end
really makes it one of the best places

00:38:21.610 --> 00:38:22.810 line:90%,end
for people to learn this stuff.

00:38:22.810 --> 00:38:24.310 line:90%,end
So check out Go Incognito down

00:38:24.310 --> 00:38:25.760 line:90%,end
in a description as well.

00:38:25.760 --> 00:38:27.610 line:90%,end
We are right about to release section

00:38:27.610 --> 00:38:29.410 line:90%,end
three in just the next few days here.

00:38:29.410 --> 00:38:30.770 line:90%,end
And I want to thank you all for listening

00:38:30.770 --> 00:38:32.510 line:90%,end
to this week's Surveillance Report.

00:38:32.510 --> 00:38:34.250 line:90%,end
As always, if this analysis helped you

00:38:34.250 --> 00:38:35.930 line:90%,end
reclaim control, become a Techlorian

00:38:35.930 --> 00:38:37.570 line:90%,end
by visiting the link in the show notes.

00:38:37.570 --> 00:38:38.450 line:90%,end
You'll gain access

00:38:38.450 --> 00:38:39.950 line:90%,end
to our exclusive Signal group.

00:38:39.950 --> 00:38:41.390 line:90%,end
You'll also get other fun perks

00:38:41.390 --> 00:38:43.240 line:90%,end
and you'll keep this podcast growing.

00:38:43.240 --> 00:38:45.450 line:90%,end
Or of course you can get Go Incognito

00:38:45.450 --> 00:38:46.970 line:90%,end
or you can gift Go Incognito

00:38:46.970 --> 00:38:49.030 line:90%,end
to any friends and family as well.

00:38:49.030 --> 00:38:50.730 line:90%,end
Finally, if you're able to, please

00:38:50.730 --> 00:38:52.350 line:90%,end
leave a rating and share this episode

00:38:52.350 --> 00:38:54.350 line:90%,end
to spread it to other people around you.

00:38:54.350 --> 00:38:55.190 line:90%,end
Thank you for listening

00:38:55.190 --> 00:38:57.200 line:90%,end
and I'll see you guys in the next episode,

00:38:57.200 --> 00:38:58.630 line:90%,end
which will be next week.

